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SPEECH AS CONDUCT

When, if ever, should speech lose its First Amendment protection on the
grounds that it’s really just conduct? Let us set aside speech or expressive
conduct that’s being restricted because of its noncommunicative aspects, for
instance because the speakers are blocking traffic or are being too loud.1
Rather, let’s focus on situations where speech causes harm because of its
content.
Consider, for instance, a book that explains how a crime can be
committed. May this speech be restricted on the grounds that it constitutes
the “conduct” of aiding and abetting, and is thus not subject to First
Amendment protection at all? Or consider racist, religiously bigoted, or
sexist statements that create an offensive work, educational, or public
accommodations environment. May they be freely restricted because they
aren’t speech but rather the “conduct” of harassment?
There are at least three main kinds of such “it’s conduct, not speech”
arguments. First, some think speech should be treated as conduct when it
has the same effects as harmful conduct, and is covered by a law that
restricts all conduct that has those effects. This can happen in many
situations:
(a) Publishing a book that describes how to grow marijuana might
constitute intentional or knowing aiding and abetting of crime.2
*
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1
See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1969) (upholding a restriction
because it was “limited to the noncommunicative aspect of O’Brien’s conduct”).
2
See infra note 25 (discussing how such liability might be imposed).
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(b) Publishing a newspaper article or Web page that points to an
infringing site may constitute contributory copyright infringement.3
(c) Publishing a news story that reveals the name of a witness, and thus
unintentionally helps a criminal intimidate or kill the witness, may
violate laws that bar knowing, reckless, or negligent crime
facilitation.4
(d) Publishing a news story that reveals the existence of a wiretap may
help the wiretap targets escape justice, and may thus violate
obstruc tion of justice laws.5
(e) Teaching one’s child racist, pro-polygamy, or pro - or antihomosexuality views may (in the views of some family court
judges) be against the best interests of the child, and may therefore
lead to loss of custody or diminished visitation.6
(f) Saying things that create an offensive work, educational, public
accomm
odation, or housing environment based on race, religion,
sex, age, disability, or sexual orientation might violate
antidiscrimination law.7
3

Contributory infringement is generally defined as behavior that materially contributes
to third parties’ copyright infringement, done with knowledge or reason to know that the
behavior will contribute to that infringement. See, e.g., Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction,
Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1996). This literally covers the publication of pointers to
infringing Web sites, as some cases and a statute, see Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating
Speech ___ (in draft), have recognized. The cases involved clickable links, but giving the
URL of an infringing site in plain text would fit the contributory infringement definition,
too.
4
See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL CODE § 115.00 (“A person is guilty of criminal facilitation . . .
when, believing it probable that he is rendering aid . . . to a person who intends to commit a
crime, he engages in conduct which provides such person with means or opportunity for
the commission thereof and which in fact aids such person to commit a felony.”); Volokh,
Crime-Facilitating Speech, supra note 3, at ___ (citing other such laws); id. at ___ (citing
cases where such publications have led to civil liability, though under the speech-specific
invasion of privacy tort rather than under a speech-neutral crime facilitation theory).
5
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c) (outlawing “corruptly . . . imped[ing] any official
proceeding”); Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, supra note 3, at ___ (citing authorities
that treat helping a person escape as obstruction of justice).
6
See, e.g., Vilakazi v. Maxie, Mass. Probate Ct. No. 479549 (Aug. 7, 1975) (changing
custody largely based on mother’s racist views), aff’d, 371 Mass. 406 (1976); Shepp v.
Shepp, 821 A.2d 635 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (likewise as to father’s pro-polygamy views);
J.L.P.(H) v. D.J.P., 643 S.W.2d 865 (Mo. App. 1982) (likewise as to father’s prohomosexuality views); cf. In re E.L.M.C., 2004 WL 1469410 (Colo. App.) (reversing a trial
court decision ordering a parent not to teach her child anti-homosexuality views, but
leaving open the possibility that the order may be reentered if the trial court finds that “the
child’s physical health would be endangered or the child’s emotional development
significantly impaired”).
7
See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Cyberspace, Harassment Law, and the
Clinton Administration, 63 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 299 (2000) (describing hostile
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(g) Speaking out against a proposed group home for the mentally
disabled might violate the Federal Housing Act’s ban on
“interfer[ing] with any person in the exercise or enjoyment” of the
right to be free from housing discrimination based on handicap.8
(h) Speech that helps the election of an anti-war candidate may violate
treason law—which prohibits intentionally aiding the enemy in time
of war—if the speaker thinks the enemy deserves to win the war.9
(i) Newspaper ads, billboards, or leafleting campaigns that praise jury
nullification may be punishable under laws that prohibit all attempts
to influence jurors.10
(j) Producing and distributing movies that stimulate copycat crimes
may be found to be tortious under general negligence principles.11
(k) Giving children sexually themed material, or for that matter political
material that most people would see as evil, may violate laws that
ban “impair[ing] the . . . morals of . . . [a] child.”12
environment harassment law, and giving examples of its application to otherwise protected
speech).
8
See White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 2000) (concluding that the Act,
which primarily covers nonspeech activity, might be read as covering, for instance,
“persuasive editorial[s] on a zoning dispute,” but holding that such a reading should be
rejected because it “would quickly run afoul of the First Amendment”).
9
See 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (defining treason as including a citizen’s “adher[ing] to [the
United States’] enemies, giving them aid and comfort”); Kawakita v. United States, 343
U.S. 717, 736, 742-44 (1952) (holding that “adhering” simply requires an intention to help
the enemy).
10
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-154 (“A person is guilty of tampering with
a juror if he influences any juror in relation to any official proceeding . . . .”); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 918.12 (“Any person who influences the judgment or decision of any grand or petit
juror . . . with intent to obstruct the administration of justice, shall be guilty of a felony . . .
.”); State v. Springer-Ertl, 610 N.W.2d 768 (S.D. 2000) (holding that people could be
punished for posting material urging jurors to acquit a particular defendant, but only if the
speech was “designed to influence specifically jurors and persons summoned or drawn as
jurors,” as opposed to speech “intend[ed] to inform the public or express a public opinion,
regardless of whether jurors—drawn, summoned, or sworn—may be among the public”);
id. at 778 (Sabers, J., dissenting) (concluding that a statute banning communication to
jurors intended to influence the jurors’ decisions was a “content-neutral statute” that was
“narrowly tailored to prevent criminal behavior” and was “unrelated to the suppression of
free expression”).
11
See, e.g., Olivia N. v. NBC, 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (rejecting
negligence liability in such a case based on the First Amendment); Yakubowicz v.
Paramount Pictures Corp., 536 N.E.2d 1067 (Mass. 1989) (same). See also In re Factor
VIII or IX Concentrate Blood Products Litigation, 25 F. Supp. 2d 837, 842 (N.D. Ill. 1998)
(imposing negligence liability for the National Hemophilia Foundation’s negligently false
statements about the safety of the blood supply, partly because of “the well-established
principle that the protections of the First Amendment do not shield the press from laws of
general applicability”).
12
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-21. Many people plausibly view many kinds of
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In all these cases, the speech would be restricted because of what it
communicates—because its content informs, persuades, or offends
people—and because of the harms that flow from this informing,
persuasion, or offense. Yet some say the First Amendment isn’t implicated,
because the law punishes conduct, not speech: “[S]peech which, in its
effect, is tantamount to legitimately proscribable nonexpressive conduct
may itself be legitimately proscribed, punished, or regulated incidentally to
the constitutional enforcement of generally applicable statutes.”13 Others
speech as impairing the morals of a child. Cf., e.g., NASSAU (N.Y.) COUNTY LOCAL LAW
11-1992 (banning the sale to children under age 17 of trading cards depicting criminals, on
the theory that such cards impair the “ethical and moral development of our youth”);
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 641-42 (1968) (discussing a similar justification for
restrictions on sexually themed material); European Union Council Directive of Oct. 3,
1989 art. 22, para. 1 (“Member States shall take appropriate measures to ensure that
television broadcasts by broadcasters under their jurisdiction do not include any
programmes which might seriously impair the physical, mental or moral development of
minors, in particular programmes that involve pornography or gratuitous violence.”). Such
a speech-specific restriction would of course trigger First Amendment scrutiny; the
question posed by the hypothetical is whether the government could avoid such scrutiny by
prosecuting such speech under a generally applicable law banning “impair[ing] the . . .
morals of . . . [a] child.”
13
Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 243 (4th Cir. 1997); see id. at 242
(arguing that publishing a book with the intent to help readers commit crime is punishable
under generally applicable “criminal aiding and abetting” law); Burns v. City of Detroit,
660 N.W.2d 85, 94 (Ct. App. Mich. 2003) (concluding that hostile environment harassment
law is constitutional because the state antidiscrimination statute “is essentially directed
toward discriminatory conduct, and oral remarks such as those at issue here are ‘swept up
incidentally within the reach of a statute directed at conduct rather than speech’”); Aguilar
v. Avis Rent a Car Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d 846, 854 (Cal. 1999) (plurality) (defending the
injunction of speech under hostile environment harassment law partly because “A statute
that is otherwise valid, and is not aimed at protected expression, does not conflict with the
First Amendment simply because the statute can be violated by the use of spoken words or
other expressive activity.”); Department of Corrections v. State Personnel Bd., 69 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 34, 53 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (Sims, J., dissenting) (concluding that an employee’s
berating a coworker for supposedly having been hired because of affirmative action created
an “abusive work environment” and thus constituted “constitutionally unprotected
conduct—unlawful discrimination—rather than protected expression”); Robinson v.
Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1535 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (enjoining
offensive speech in the workplace under a hostile environment theory because
“[pornographic] pictures and verbal harassment are not protected speech because they act
as discriminatory conduct in the form of a hostile work environment”); Doe v. University
of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 862 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (dictum) (distinguishing “pure speech”
from “sexually abusive and harassing conduct” such as workplace harassment); Trayling v.
Board of Fire and Police Comm’rs, 652 N.E.2d 386, 395 (Ill. App. 1995) (defending sexual
harassment rules partly on the grounds that “Prohibitions against sexual harassment are
generally applicable laws,” though doing this in the special context of the government
acting as employer); Susan W. Brenner, Complicit Publication: When Should the
Dissemination of Ideas and Data Be Criminalized?, 13 ALB. L.J. OF SCI. & TECH. 273,
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argue that the generally applicable law should be treated as akin to a
content-neutral restriction on expressive conduct, and thus fairly easily
upheld under the deferential O’Brien test14 because the application of the
law to the speech is just “incidental” to the law’s overall thrust. 15
Second, a different kind of “conduct, not speech” argument is
sometimes made even to defend laws that do specifically target
communication, such as statutes that ban the publication of bombmaking
information. Speech, the argument runs, is punishable because it is part of
an illegal “course of conduct,” or is perhaps “speech brigaded with
action,”16 a “speech act” rather than pure speech.17 This is especially so
377-78, 392 (2003) (generally endorsing “[t]he ‘speech act’ approach[, which] criminalizes
speech because it is the act by which one either violates an independent criminal
prohibition”—seemingly referring to prohibitions that say nothing about speech—“or
facilitates the violation of such a prohibition”); Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s
Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 768 (2001) (“A person who breaks a law not directed at
speech can claim no constitutional immunity just because he was acting for expressive
reasons.”). Some have also interpreted R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389 (1992),
as taking this view, but I believe that’s a mistake, see infra note 56.
14
See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1969).
15
See Rodney Smolla, Rethinking First Amendment Assumptions About Racist and
Sexist Speech, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 171, 187 (1990) (defending application of hostile
environment law to restrict offensive workplace speech because “The gravamen of the
tortious activity in [certain] cases . . . is arguably the proscription of underlying nonspeech
conduct such as . . . anti-social behavior in the workplace. The penalty exacted on speech
in such cases appears incidental to the governmental purpose . . . .”); Elena Kagan, When a
Speech Code Is a Speech Code, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 957, 965 & n.24, 968 (1996)
(seemingly suggesting that policies banning “harassment” in universities, presumably
referring to hostile environment harassment, should only be reviewed under O’Brien, even
when they’re applied to otherwise fully protected speech); Schutz v. Schutz, 581 So.2d
1290, 1292 (Fla. 1991) (upholding injunction ordering mother to say things “necessary to
restore and promote the frequent and continuing positive interaction (e.g., visitation, phone
calls, letters) between the children and their father and to refrain from doing or saying
anything likely to defeat that end,” on the grounds that such an order was simply
“incidental” to protecting the best interests of the child, and should therefore be reviewed
under O’Brien); Borra v. Borra, 756 A.2d 647, 651 (N.J. Super. 2000) (taking a similar
view); Laurel S. Banks, Schutz v. Schutz, 31 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 105, 115 (1992-93)
(approving of the Schutz analysis). But see In re Marriage of Olson, 850 P.2d 527, 532
(Wash. App. 1993) (treating restrictions such as those in Schutz as content-based); David L.
Ferguson, Comment, Schutz v. Schutz: More than a Mere “Incidental” Burden on First
Amendment Rights, 16 NOVA L. REV. 937, 951 (1992) (likewise).
16
See, e.g., Rice v. Paladin Press, Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 244 (4th Cir. 1997) (treating
“speech brigaded with action” as equivalent to “speech which, in its effect, is tantamount to
legitimately proscribable nonexpressive conduct,” citing Giboney).
17
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1997 REPORT ON THE AVAILABILITY OF BOMBMAKING
INFORMATION,
available
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/bombmakinginfo.html, Introduction (“[T]he
constitutional analysis is quite different where the government punishes speech that is an
integral part of a transaction involving conduct the government otherwise is empowered to
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when speech seems likely to cause harms that would be punishable if
caused by conduct rather than speech—when “words are bullets,” in the
sense of being “a specific tool or weapon used . . . for the express purpose”
of bringing about a harmful result.18 Such arguments often quote Giboney
v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., a 1949 case that asserted that
It rarely has been suggested that the constitutional freedom for speech and
press extends its immunity to speech or writing used as an integral part of
conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute. . . . [I]t has never been
deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech or press to make a course of
conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or
carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed.19

And Giboney has been applied to justify, among other things, restrictions on
(1) speech that advocates crime, (2) speech that explains how crimes can be
committed, (3) doctors’ speech recommending medicinal marijuana to their
patients, (4) speech that urges political boycotts, (5) speech that creates an
offensive work environment, (6) racially offensive business names, and
even (7) public profanity. 20
Third, an influential book—Professor Kent Greenawalt’s Speech,
Crime, and the Uses of Language (1989)—has argued that certain kinds of
speech, such as offers, agreements, orders, permissions, and some threats
constitute “situation-altering utterances” and should therefore be treated as
unprotected conduct. Finally, the “speech as conduct” argument is
sometimes made to explain some of the uncharted zones of First
Amendment law: categories of speech whose First Amendment status the
Court has never squarely confronted, such as aiding and abetting, criminal
solicitation, conspiracy, perjury, agreements to restrain trade, and
professional advice to clients. Most lawyers would likely agree that such
speech should generally be unprotected or at least less protected; and a
common explanation for the Court’s lack of attention to these speech
restrictions is that the speech is actually conduct, rather than pure speech,
prohibit; such ‘speech acts’ . . . may be proscribed without much, if any, concern about the
First Amendment, since it is merely incidental that such ‘conduct’ takes the form of
speech.”). Because the Justice Department report is far more easily accessible to readers
on the Department Web site than it is in the limited print edition that was submitted to
Congress, I will cite to the online version.
18
Cf. 14 LA. REV. STAT. § 390 (enacted 1962) (supporting a ban on Communist
propaganda by arguing that “‘Words are bullets’ and the communists know it and use them
so”; “The danger of communist propaganda lies . . . in the fact that it is a specific tool or
weapon used by the communists for the express purpose of bringing about the forcible total
destruction or subjugation of this state and nation . . . .”).
19
336 U.S. 490, 498, 502 (1949). I set aside for purposes of this Article situations
where speech is really just used as evidence of nonspeech conduct (for instance, when a
defendant is prosecuted for killing someone, and some of the defendant’s statements are
used to show his motive). See infra Part III.B.2.
20
See sources cited infra notes 120-129.
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and thus unprotected by the First Amendment.
This Article will argue that these “it’s not speech, it’s conduct”
doctrines are misguided. The doctrines, if followed, would require courts to
focus on the wrong questions, and would often lead courts to reach the
wrong results (for instance, in many of the situations that I give as examples
above).
Part II will argue that generally applicable laws can’t be upheld simply
because they’re facially content-neutral, or even facially speech-neutral.
Rather, when a generally applicable law is content-based as applied—when
speech triggers the law because of the harms that may flow from what the
speech says—it should be subject to full-fledged First Amendment scrutiny.
If someone interferes with the draft by blocking the entrance to a draft
office, he may properly be punished under a law that bans interfering with
the draft. If someone interferes with the draft by publishing a book that
persuades people to resist the draft, he may not be punished, though his
conduct might violate the same generally applicable law.
Speech and conduct, or more precisely the speech elements of some
behavior and its nonspeech elements, should indeed be distinguished, and
the nonspeech elements may be much more heavily regulated. But the
distinction should be the one suggested by United States v. O’Brien and the
other cases that distinguish content-neutral from content-based speech
restrictions: Expression can generally be regulated to prevent harms that
flow from its noncommunicative elements (noise, traffic obstruction, and
the like), but not harms that flow from what the expression expresses.21
Neither generally applicable laws nor specially targeted laws should be
allowed to restrict speech because of what it says, unless the speech falls
within one of the exceptions to protection (for instance, because it’s a threat
or a false statement of fact) or unless the restriction passes strict scrutiny.
Moreover, this analysis cuts against some commentators’ arguments that
First Amendment doctrine should primarily focus on smoking out
impermissible speech-restrictive motivations on the legislature’s part.22
When the law generally applies to a wide range of conduct, and sweeps in
speech together with such conduct, there’s little reason to think that
lawmakers had any motivation with regard to speech, much less an
impermissible one. And yet, as I argue, such a law should still be
unconstitutional when it’s applied to speech based on its content—even
though the legislature’s motivations may have been quite benign.23
21

See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1969).
See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental
Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413 (1996); Rubenfeld, supra
note 13.
23
See infra Part II.E.1.
22
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Part III will argue that the Giboney doctrine, whether framed as
applying to “speech acts,” to speech “brigaded with action,” or to speech
that carries out an illegal “course of conduct,” is indeterminate, dangerous,
and inconsistent with more recent cases. Giboney and the cases that cite it
don’t explain which speech should be punishable and which should not.
The Giboney doctrine has been used to support the punishment of speech
that under current law is rightly protected. And even when the Giboney
argument has been used to support restricting speech that should indeed be
restrictable, it still hasn’t adequately explained where the First Amendment
boundaries should be drawn.
Part IV will make two observations about the “situation-altering
uttera nces” argument. First, the category that Professor Greenawalt
proposes is narrower than its name might suggest. Many utterances that in
many senses alter the situation would remain presumptively protected
speech even under his analysis. That includes the speech in nearly all the
examples given above. The “situation-altering utterances” argument is by
its own terms inapplicable there.
Second, it seems to me that the key insight underlying the argument—
that utterances lose their protection when they alter the speaker’s, the
listener’s, or some third party’s perceived moral obligations—is not quite
persuasive. As I’ll argue in Part IV.B, it’s not clear why such an effect
should change the First Amendment status of speech; I’ll point to some
examples of speech that likewise alters people’s felt moral obligations but
that seems to be pure speech, rather than conduct. I think Speech, Crime,
and the Uses of Language is right to conclude that agreements, offers, and
other categories of speech should be unprotected. The reason for this,
though, doesn’t seem to be simply that such statements are “situationaltering.”
All this, though, leaves several First Amendment puzzles. Just why are
criminal agreements, criminal solicitation, and most verbal aiding and
abetting punishable, even when they are accomplished solely through
words? Why can some speech be restricted under antitrust law or securities
law? Part V will argue that these puzzles should be solved the same way
the Court has explained why incitement, libel, fraud, threats, and other
speech are punishable: By recognizing that these speech restrictions are
indeed speech restrictions, and by delineating the proper constitutional
boundaries of these restrictions.
This delineation would require a considerable amount of work, and this
Article will only sketch the outlines of this task. But embracing this task is
better—and more likely to lead to right results—than avoiding it through
simply labeling speech “conduct,” with no explanation for why certain
forms of communication are protected and certain others are not.
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LAWS OF GENERAL APPLICABILITY

A. Content-Based as Applied vs. Content-Neutral as Applied
Let’s say that a generally applicable law is applied to speech, though on
its face the law doesn’t mention speech. Sometimes, as in United States v.
O’Brien, the law may be triggered by the “noncommunicative impact of
[the speech], and [by] nothing else.”24 A law barring noise louder than 90
decibels, for instance, might apply to the use of bullhorns in a
demonstration. We might call such a generally applicable law “contentneutral as applied,” because it applies to speech without regard to its
content.
But sometimes the law may be triggered by what the speech
communicates. The law may, for instance, prohibit any conduct that is
likely to have a certain effect, and the effect may sometimes be caused by
the content of speech: A law prohibiting aiding and abetting crime, for
example, might in some circumstances be violated by a person’s publishing
a book that describes how a crime can be easily committed.25
We might call this law “content-based as applied,” because its
application is triggered by the content of the speech. The law doesn’t just
have the effect of restricting some speech more than other speech—most
content-neutral laws do that.26 Rather, the law applies to speech precisely
because of the harms that supposedly flow from the content: Publishing
and distributing the book violates the aiding and abetting law because of
24

See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1969) (holding that a
generally applicable law banning destruction of draft cards should be judged under a
relatively forgiving First Amendment standard, rather than strict scrutiny, because it
applied to the defendant “[f]or [the] noncommunicative impact of his conduct, and for
nothing else”); Melville B. Nimmer, The Meaning of Symbolic Speech Under the First
Amendment, 21 UCLA L. REV. 29, 38, 45 (1973) (similarly distinguishing laws that restrict
speech because of a government “non-speech interest,” which turns on the
noncommunicative impact of the speech, from laws that restrict expression because of a
government “anti-speech interest,” which turns on the harms “caused by the meaning effect
of the speech”).
25
See, e.g., IND. STAT. § 35-41-2-4 (“A person who knowingly or intentionally aids . .
. another person to commit an offense commits that offense”); Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc.,
128 F.3d 233, 242-43 (4th Cir. 1997) (arguing that publishing a book that intentionally
explains how to commit a crime may constitute aiding and abetting of the crime); U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 17, at text accompanying notes 55-60 (taking the same view
as Rice). See generally Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, supra note 3, at ___.
26
For instance, my sense is that bans on residential picketing in the late 1980s
probably disproportionately affected speech criticizing abortion providers, since the prolife movement seems to have used residential picketing more than many other political
movements did.
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what the book says.
The rest of this Part will argue that laws that are content-based as
applied should be presumptively unconstitutional, just as facially contentbased laws are presumptively unconstitutional. Both presumptions may
sometimes be rebutted, for instance if the speech falls within an exception
to protection,27 or if the speech restriction passes strict scrutiny.28 But
generally speaking, when a law punishes speech because its content may
cause harmful effects, that law should be treated as content-based.
B. Supreme Court Cases
The Court, it turns out, has actually confronted many cases where a law
was content-based as applied. In all those cases, either the Court held that
the speech was constitutionally protected—or, if it held otherwise, the
decision is now viewed as obsolete.
Consider, for instance, the World War I-era cases Debs v. United States,
Frohwerk v. United States, and Schenck v. United States.29 These cases,
which upheld the criminal punishment of antiwar speech, are now generally
seen as having been wrongly decided.30 But the convictions involved the
violation of a generally applicable provision of the Espionage Act, which
barred all conduct—speech or not—that “willfully obstruct[ed] the
recruitment or enlistment service of the United States, to the injury of the
service or the United States.”31
The Act could have been constitutionally applied to burning a recruiting
27

See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1992).
See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending
Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2418-24 (1997).
29
249 U.S. 211 (1919); 249 U.S. 204 (1919); 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
30
See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLITICS
966 (2d ed. 2002); Steven G. Gey, The Nuremberg Files and the First Amendment Value of
Threats, 78 TEX. L. REV. 541, 569 (2000); Michael Vitiello, The Nuremberg Files: Testing
The Outer Limits of the First Amendment, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1175, 1218-19 (2000).
31
Espionage Act of 1917, sec. 3, 65th Cong., sess. I, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217-31. See also
Gara v. United States, 178 F.2d 38, 41 (6th Cir. 1949) (upholding conviction for
“knowingly counsel[ing], aid[ing], or abet[ting]” draft evasion, partly on the grounds that
“violation of [the law], particularly as to aiding and abetting, might be consummated
without any expression of opinion,” and that the First Amendment provides no protection
just because “the acts of violation are consummated, as counseling always must be, through
the medium of words”), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 340 U.S. 857 (1949).
Debs and Frohwerk involved prosecutions solely under the generally applicable
provision of the Act. Schenck was also convicted on two counts of unlawfully mailing
certain material; those counts did not involve generally applicable provisions. I suspect,
though, that most critics of the Schenck are at least as concerned about the generally
applicable Espionage Act, which had the effect of outlawing anti-draft speech generally, as
about the provisions that were limited to distributing anti-draft speech through the mails.
28

1-Sep- 04]

SPEECH AS CONDUCT

11

office (nonspeech conduct), or perhaps to disrupting the business of a
recruiting office by using bullhorns outside the office windows (speech
punished because of its noncommunicative impact).32 But under modern
First Amendment law, convictions for antiwar leafleting or speeches would
be overturned, and the law treated as content-based,33 because such antiwar
speech interferes with the draft precisely because of its content.34
More broadly, if generally applicable laws were immune from First
Amendment scrutiny, then the government could suppress much speech that
is now constitutionally protected—advocacy of illegal conduct, praise of
illegal conduct, or even advocacy of legal conduct. A generally applicable
ban on “assisting, directly or indirectly, conspiracies to overthrow the
government” could prohibit advocacy of overthrow alongside physical
conduct such as making bombs: Advocacy of overthrow assists such
overthrow, by persuading people to join or at least not oppose the
revolutionary movement. A ban on “assisting interference with the
provision of abortion services” could ban speech that praises or defends
anti-abortion blockaders or vandals, and not just actual blockading or
vandalism.
A ban on “conduct that knowingly or recklessly aids the enemy in time
of war” could, among other things, ban speech that helps the election of an
anti-war candidate.35 Such speech could even be banned by the existing law
32

Cf. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949) (plurality) (holding that the
government may to some extent restrict sound amplification); id. at 97 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (agreeing on this point); id. (Jackson, J., concurring in the
judgment) (likewise). Cf. L.A. Powe, Jr., Searching for the False Shout of “Fire”, 19
CONST. COMM. 345, 347 (2002) (concluding that Justice Holmes reached the result in
Schenck precisely because he saw it as involving a generally applicable criminal law, rather
than a speech restriction; “The distinction between an attempt by conduct and an attempt
by speech was, for Holmes, a distinction without a difference.”).
33
See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 465 (1980) (citing Schenck as an example
of a case that involved a content-based distinction); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,
745 (1978) (plurality) (likewise).
34
See Vincent Blasi, Six Conservatives in Search of the First Amendment: The
Revealing Case of Nude Dancing, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 611, 645-46 (1992) (likewise
noting that many of the cases mentioned in the text involved a generally applicable law, but
that the speech should nonetheless have been protected against those laws); Geoffrey R.
Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 19899 (1983) (characterizing the law in Schenck as a “content-based restriction” “which
prohibited expression critical of the war and the draft,” though the portion of the Act that
generally prohibited expression critical of the war and the draft—as opposed to merely
false information about the war—was generally applicable to conduct as well as speech).
35
See Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict
Scrutiny, supra note 28, at 2425-31 (describing this hypothetical); cf. Letter from Abraham
Lincoln to Erastus Corning and Others (June 12, 1863), in ABRAHAM LINCOLN, SPEECHES
AND WRITINGS, 1859-1865, at 454 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed. 1989) (arguing that such anti-
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of treason, which bars intentionally aiding the enemy during wartime, if a
prosecutor can persuade the jury that the speaker was motivated by a desire
to help the other side.36 A ban on “conduct that interferes with the
enforcement of judicial decrees” may be applied to speech that criticizes
judges or judicial actions, on the theory that such criticism may lead people
to lose respect for courts, and thus to disobey court orders.37
All the speech in these examples may help bring about the harms that
the government is trying to prevent using a generally applicable law. It may
even involve “words that may have all the effect of force,” an example that
Schenck gave as quintessentially unprotected speech (citing Gompers v.
Buck’s Stove & Range Co., which upheld an injunction against newspaper
articles that urged a labor boycott):38 The speech may have an effect that
would be eminently punishable if it were brought about by force rather than
communication. But the premise of the retreat from Schenck, and of the
adoption of the Brandenburg v. Ohio rule, is that the government must
generally tolerate such advocacy even when the persuasiveness or the
informational content of the speech can lead to eventual harm.39
Similarly, consider NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware,40 where the Court
war speech may be punishable, though focusing more on the speech as advocacy of
desertion rather than treason as such); MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, “THE
PEOPLE’S DARLING PRIVILEGE” 300-18 (2000) (discussing the Vallandigham incident);
Michael Kent Curtis, Lincoln, Vallandigham, and Anti-War Speech in the Civil War, 7
WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 105, 121-22, 161 (1998) (likewise).
36
See 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (defining treason as including a citizen’s “adher[ing] to [the
United States’] enemies, giving them aid and comfort”); Kawakita v. United States, 343
U.S. 717, 736, 742-44 (1952) (holding that “adhering” simply requires an intention to help
the enemy).
37
See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941) (striking down a contempt of court
citation in such a case); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946) (same); Wood v.
Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962) (same). These cases involved the common-law crime of
contempt of court; contempt was sometimes defined quite generally as “disregard of the
authority of the court” (a definition that would cover a wide variety of conduct, such as
violation of a court order, as well as speech), and sometimes more specifically as covering
a long list of behavior including “Dissemination of contemptuous publications.” See
EDWARD M. DANGEL, NATIONAL LAWYERS’ MANUAL—CONTEMPT § 2 (1939). But as the
example in the text shows, the same results could have been reached under a generally
applicable contempt rule. See also Brenner, supra note 13
, at 321 -22 (treating contempt of
court law as a generally applicable rule, though acknowledging that “when criminal
contempt is based on the communicative content of speech, it is an attempt to control
speech that implicates the guarantees of the First Amendment”).
38
249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (citing 221 U.S. 418, 439 (1911)).
39
See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 848 n.56 (2d ed. 1987)
(“Moreover, however a law is written, it may not constitutionally be applied to punish
speech on content-related grounds where nothing beyond abstract advocacy is shown, and
where incitement is thus absent.”).
40
458 U.S. 886 (1982).
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held that speech constituting tortious interference with business relations
may nonetheless be constitutionally protected. This tort covers a variety of
conduct, not just speech.41 But when the interference flows from the
persuasive or informative effect of speech—for instance, when the speech
in Claiborne persuaded people to boycott a business, publicized the name of
people who weren’t complying with the boycott, or persuaded others to
ostracize people who refused to join the boycott—the tort is treated as a
speech restriction.
In some situations, the tort may be a constitutionally permissible
restriction, for instance when the speech is a constitutionally unprotected
threat, incitement, or the like.42 But if the speech falls outside an exception
to protection, and if it causes harm through its content, then the First
Amendment protects the speech against the generally applicable tort just as
much as it protects the speech against facially content-based laws.
The same is true, in considerable measure, for antitrust laws or more
broadly laws that prohibit restraint of trade. Such laws are also generally
applicable, and are generally used to punish conduct, not speech. But when
organizations help restrain trade by lobbying legislatures and the public for
anticompetitive regulations, Eastern Railroad Conference v. Noerr Motors
and United Mine Workers v. Pennington hold that the speech may not be
punished.43
41

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 766B cmt. b, 767 cmt. c (citing
Tarleton v. McGawley, 170 Eng. Rep. 153 (K.B. 1793), a case imposing liability for
physically attacking trading partners, as the ancestor of this tort); see, e.g., Lucas v.
Monroe County, 203 F.3d 964, 969 (6th Cir. 2000) (allowing cause of action based on
discriminatory refusal by a county government to deal with a contractor); H.J., Inc. v.
International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 867 F.2d 1531, 1548 (8th Cir. 1989) (allowing cause of
action based on defendants’ selling product below cost in order to monopolize a market).
42
See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886, 927-28 (1982); Hustler
Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988). Claiborne Hardware may be criticized on
the grounds that some of the speech there was indeed threatening, especially against the
backdrop of violence related to the boycott. But the Court concluded that the speech was
indeed not an unprotected threat or unprotected incitement; and given this, the Court’s
further holding—which is that such presumptively protected speech couldn’t be made the
subject of an interference with business relations tort—seems quite correct.
43
365 U.S. 127 (1961); 381 U.S. 657 (1965). Noerr and Pennington reached a speechprotective result by interpreting the Sherman Act not to apply to anticompetitive lobbying
or public advocacy; but it’s clear that the Court’s judgment was influenced by a desire to
avoid a First Amendment violation. See, e.g., Noerr, 365 U.S. at 138; FTC v. Superior
Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 424 (1990). See also David McGowan & Mark
A. Lemley, Antitrust Immunity: State Action and Federalism, Petitioning and the First
Amendment, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 293, 363-66 (1994) (arguing that Noerr/Pennington immunity makes sense only as a First Amendment exception to antitrust law, and
not as a faithful interpretation of antitrust law standing alone).
These cases involved civil lawsuits, but surely speech should be at least as protected
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This principle also applies when the speech causes harm because of its
offensive content rather than its persuasive or informative content.
Consider Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, which held that the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress couldn’t be used to punish a cruel
and vulgar Hustler satire of Jerr y Falwell.44 Though claims under the
emotional distress tort are often based on speech, speech is not an element
of the tort. The publisher of Hustler, for instance, would have been equally
guilty of intentional infliction of emotional distress if he had played a
highly embarrassing practical joke on Falwell. 45 But when the general law
was applied to the magazine because of the content of its speech, the Court
held such liability to be unconstitutional.46
The same is true of Cohen v. California, where Cohen was prosecuted
for a violation of a generally applicable breach of the peace statute.47 The
statute would have applied equally to conduct (fighting), speech that
breaches the peace because of its noncommunicative impact (loud speech in
the middle of the night), and speech that breaches the peace because of its
content (wearing a “Fuck the Draft” jacket). But the Court struck down the
application of the law in this last situation, precisely because the law
covered Cohen because of what he said.
Likewise, Hess v. Indiana,48 Ter miniello v. City of Chicago,49 Cantwell
against criminal punishments as it is against civil suits.
44
485 U.S. 46 (1988).
45
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, ill. 3 (“A is invited to a
swimming party at an exclusive resort. B gives her a bathing suit which he knows will
dissolve in water. It does dissolve while she is swimming, leaving her naked in the
presence of men and women whom she has just met. A suffers extreme embarrassment,
shame, and humiliation. B is subject to liability to A for her emotional distress.”).
46
The Hustlerdecision relied on the speech being on matters of publi c concern and
about a public figure; the Court might yet recognize a free speech exception for intentional
infliction of emotional distress where private figures or statements on matters of private
concern are involved. But this would happen because that speech is seen as harmful and
not valuable enough to be protected, not because the tort is a law of general applicability
(since the tort’s general applicability wasn’t enough to save it in Hustler).
47
403 U.S. 15 (1971) (involving a statute that, in relevant part, barred people from
“maliciously and willfully disturb[ing] the peace or quiet of any neighborhood or person . .
. by tumultuous or offensive conduct”).
48
414 U.S. 105 (1973) (involving a statute barring people from “act[ing] in a loud,
boisterous or disorderly manner so as to disturb the peace and quiet of any neighborhood or
family, by loud or unusual noise, or by tumultuous or offensive behavior, threatening,
traducing, quarreling, challenging to fight or fighting”).
49
337 U.S. 1, 2 n.1 (1949) (involving a statute barring people from “making any
improper noise, riot, disturbance, breach of the peace, or diversion tending to a breach of
the peace,” with “breach of the peace” defined in a jury instruction as “misbehavior which
violates the public peace and decorum” or “stirs the public to anger, invites dispute, brings
about a condition of unrest, or creates a disturbance, or . . . molests the inhabitants in the
enjoyment of peace and quiet by arousing alarm”). See also Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S.
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v. Connecticut,50 and Edwards v. South Carolina51 all set aside breach of the
peace and disorderly conduct convictions, though the statutes involved were
content-based only as applied, not on their face. As the Court pointed out in
Cantwell, “breach of the peace” legitimately “embraces a great variety of
conduct destroying or menacing public order and tranquility,” including
“violent acts”; but the First Amendment may be violated when conduct
amounts to a breach of the peace due only to “the effect of [the speaker‘s]
communication upon his hearers.”52
So all the laws in these examples were facially speech-neutral. Most,
and probably all, were enacted by legislatures or created by courts without
any censorious motive, partly because their creators were trying to punish
and prevent harm, not speech as such. Yet these cases—or, as to the
Espionage Act cases, the modern repudiation of those cases53—treat the
application of these laws based on the content of speech just as skeptically
as the Court has treated facially content-based restrictions.54 Likewise, later
decisions treat Cantwell, Cohen, Edwards, and Terminiello as involving
content-based speech restrictions.55
315 (1951), which involved a statute stating that “Any person who with intent to provoke a
breach of the peace, or whereby a breach of the peace may be occasioned” “[u]ses
offensive, disorderly, threatening, abusive or insulting language, conduct or behavior,”
“[a]cts in such a manner as to annoy, disturb, interfere with, obstruct, or be offensive to
others,” or “[c]ongregates with others on a public street and refuses to move on when
ordered by the police,” “shall be deemed to have committed the offense of disorderly
conduct.” The conviction in Feiner was upheld, but only on the grounds that the speech
was unprotected by the First Amendment because it posed a “clear and present danger of . .
. immediate threat to public safety.”
50
310 U.S. 296, 308-09 (1940).
51
372 U.S. 229, 235-37 (1963) (involving a statute barring “disturbance of the public
tranquility[] by any act or conduct inciting to violence,” but concluding that speech that
disturbs the public tranquility because “the opinions which [the speakers] were peaceably
expressing were sufficiently opposed to the views of the majority of the community to
attract a crowd and necessitate police protection” is constitutionally protected even if it’s
covered by such a breach of the peace statute).
52
310 U.S. 296, 308-09 (1940).
53
See supra note 30.
54
See Blasi, supra note 34, at 646 (noting this); David Bogen, Generally Applicable
Laws and the First Amendment, 26 SW. U. L. REV. 201, 222-23 (1997) (likewise
distinguishing generally applicable laws that are applied to speech for reasons unrelated to
its content from generally applicable laws that are applied to speech precisely because of its
content).
55
United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000) (“Where
the designed benefit of a content-based speech restriction is to shield the sensibilities of
listeners, the general rule is that the right of expression prevails, even where no less
restrictive alternative exists. We are expected to protect our own sensibilities ‘simply by
averting [our] eyes.’ Cohen v. California.”); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382
(1992) (“The First Amendment generally prevents government from proscribing speech,
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I will argue below that the Court has indeed been right to condemn
restrictions that are content-based as applied. But for now, these cases
should at least show that any broad First Amendment immunity for
generally applicable laws would be incompatible with many leading
precedents.56 The laws described in Part I should be treated as involving
content-based speech restrictions. They shouldn’t evade serious First
Amendment scrutiny on the grounds that they are generally applicable.
C. The Press Cases
So far, I’ve used the term “generally applicable law” simply to mean “a
law applicable equally to a wide variety of conduct, whether speech or not.”
But “generally applicable law” can mean several different things, depending
on context:
(1) a facially speech-neutral law, which is to say a law applicable to a
wide variety of conduct, whether speech or not;
(2) a facially religion-neutral law, which is to say a law applicable
equally to religious observers and to others; or
(3) a facially press-neutral law, which is to say a law applicable equally
to the press and to others.
see, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, . . . because of disapproval of the ideas expressed.
Content-based regulations are presumptively invalid.”); Forsyth County v. Nationalist
Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134-35 (1992) (“Listeners’ reaction to speech is not a contentneutral basis for regulation. Speech cannot be financially burdened, any more than it can
be punished or banned, simply because it might offend a hostile mob. See . . . Terminiello
v. Chicago.”); Young v. American Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 64 (1976) (plurality) (quoting
Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“But, above all else, the First Amendment
means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its
ideas, its subject matter, or its content. Cohen v. California; . . . Terminiello v.
Chicago.”)); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 586 (1969) (“It is firmly settled that under
our Constitution the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the
ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers. See, e.g., . . . Edwards v. South
Carolina; Terminiello v. City of Chicago; cf. Cantwell v. Connecticut.”).
56
A few courts and commentators have cited R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,
389 (1992), for the proposition that there’s no First Amendment problem when speech is
subjected, based on its content, to generally applicable laws. See, e.g., supra note 13
(citing Burns v. City of Detroit, the Avis v. Aguilar plurality, and the Dep’t of Corrections
v. State Personnel Bd. dissent). But R.A.V. dealt only with whether the government may
discriminate based on content among speech that falls within the existing First Amendment
exceptions, such as fighting words. The Court specifically said only that “a particular
content-based subcategory of a proscribable class of speech can be swept up incidentally
within the reach of a statute directed at conduct rather than speech,” 505 U.S. at 389
(emphasis added); and its logic is indeed limited to restrictions on speech that fits within
one of the exceptions, see Eugene Volokh, Comment, Freedom of Speech and Workplace
Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1791, 1829-32 (1992) (discussing this in some detail);
Saxe v. State College Area School Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 207-08 (3rd Cir. 2001) (likewise).

1-Sep- 04]

SPEECH AS CONDUCT

17

These three meanings—facially speech-neutral, facially religion-neutral,
and facially press-neutral—are different, though they sometimes share the
same label “generally applicable law.” For instance, libel law principles are
generally press-neutral but not speech-neutral. A tax on all books is
religion-neutral but not press-neutral.
Unfortunately, since all these laws are sometimes called “generally
applicable,” these definitions can get confused for one another. One major
argument against the position I defend in the previous section flows from
this very sort of confusion. That argument cites Cohen v. Cowles Media,57
and the opinions on which that opinion relies, for the proposition that
applying generally applicable laws to speech doesn’t violate the First
Amendment.58
In Cohen v. Cowles Media, the Court did hold that “generally applicable
laws do not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement
against the press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the
news,” and cited several other cases that so held.59 But this only means that
press-neutral laws are constitutional. The Court did not say that speechneutral laws, especially ones that are content-based as applied, are
inherently constitutional.
Cohen v. Cowles Media involved a promissory estoppel lawsuit by a
source against a newspaper publisher. Cowles breached its promise not to
reveal Cohen’s name; Cohen sued for this breach and won, and the Court
held that the damages award didn’t violate the First Amendment. In the
process, the Court reasoned that the case was controlled by the
well-established line of decisions holding that generally applicable laws do
not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against the
press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news. As the
cases relied on by respondents recognize, the truthful information sought to be
published must have been lawfully acquired. The press may not with
impunity break and enter an office or dwelling to gather news. Neither does
the First Amendment relieve a newspaper reporter of the obligation shared by
all citizens to respond to a grand jury subpoena and answer questions relevant
to a criminal investigation, even though the reporter might be required to
reveal a confidential source. The press, like others interested in publishing,
may not publish copyrighted material without obeying the copyright laws.
Similarly, the media must obey the National Labor Relations Act and the Fair
Labor Standards Act, Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling; may not
restrain trade in violation of the antitrust laws; and must pay
nondiscriminatory taxes. It is therefore beyond dispute that “[t]he publisher of
a newspaper has no special immunity from the application of general laws.
57

501 U.S. 663 (1991).
See, e.g., Rice v. Paladin Press, 128 F.3d 233, 243 (4th Cir. 1997); Bogen, supra
note 54, at 227; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 17, at n.56.
59
501 U.S. at 669.
58
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He has no special privilege to invade the rights and liberties of others.”
Accordingly, enforcement of such general laws against the press is not subject
to stricter scrutiny than would be applied to enforcement against other persons
or organizations.
There can be little doubt that the Minnesota doctrine of promissory
estoppel is a law of general applicability. It does not target or single out the
press. Rather, insofar as we are advised, the doctrine is generally applicable to
the daily transactions of all the citizens of Minnesota. The First Amendment
does not forbid its application to the press.60

The Court repeatedly stressed that it was discussing only whether the
press gets special exemption from laws that are equally applicable to the
press and to others; this quote mentions “the press,” “newspapers,” or “the
media” nine times. Each of the examples mentions what “the press,” “the
media,” “newspaper[s],” and “newspaper reporter[s]” have no special right
to do. And this makes sense, because the Court was overruling the
Minnesota Supreme Court’s conclusion that the First Amendment requires
courts to “balance the constitutional rights of a free press against the
common law interest in protecting a promise of anonymity.”61
Moreover, two of the Court’s examples are consistent only with the
interpretation that the Court used “generally applicable” to mean pressneutral rather than speech-neutral. First, copyright law (which the Court
also mentions as an example later in the opinion62) is press-neutral but not
speech-neutral. In 1977, when Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting—
the case that the Court cited when mentioning copyright—was decided,
copyright law applied exclusively to speech and other communication, as it
had through most of its history. Even today it applies mostly to such
communication, though over the past few decades it has been extended to
cover architectural works and computer program object code.63
60

Id. at 669-70 (citations omitted).
457 N.W.2d 199, 205 (Minn. 1990) (emphasis added).
62
See 501 U.S. at 671 (“The dissenting opinions suggest that the press should not be
subject to any law, including copyright law for example, which in any fashion or to any
degree limits or restricts the press’ right to report truthful information. The First
Amendment does not grant the press such limitless protection.”).
63
See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-568, 102 Stat.
2853, sec. 4 (1988) (amending Copyright Act to cover architectural works); Pub. L. 96517, 94 Stat. 3015, sec. 10 (1980) (amending Copyright Act to mention computer
programs). U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 17, at n.56, argues that Cohen v. Cowles
Media and Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977), stand for
the proposition “that generally applicable common-law causes of action typically will not
offend the First Amendment in cases where they are applied to expressive conduct such as
publication or broadcast,” unless “an element of that cause of action inevitably (or almost
always) depends on the communicative impact of speech or expression.” This assertion,
though, ignores the fact that Zacchini itself involved the right of publicity, a tort that
invariably involves “expressive conduct such as publication or broadcast”; and it doesn’t
61
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Second, as Part II.B pointed out, the First Amendment sometimes does
provide a defense against antitrust law, when the alleged restraint of trade
comes from a defendant’s speech that advocates legislation. Citizen
Publishing Co. v. United States and Associated Press v. United States, the
two antitrust cases that the Court cited, hold that newspapers can’t raise
their status as members of the press as a defense to antitrust law. But Noerr
and Pennington make clear that speakers can raise as a defense the fact that
the law is being applied to them because of their speech.64
So the Court’s “general applicability” reasoning that I quote above
means simply that the law was press-neutral, and thus not subject to any
heightened scrutiny because it was applied to the press.65 That, of course,
left the argument that the law did restrict speech: After all, it was Cowles
Media’s speech that constituted the potentially actionable breaking of a
promise.
But later in the opinion, the Court does explain why promissory
estoppel law is indeed constitutionally applicable to all speakers, whether
press or not: “Minnesota law,” the Court holds, “simply requires those
making promises to keep them. The parties themselves, as in this case,
determine the scope of their legal obligations, and any restrictions which
may be placed on the publication of truthful information are selfimposed.”66 The free speech argument was rejected based on the principle
that free speech rights, like most other rights, can be waived.67 It wasn’t
rejected based on an assertion that speech-neutral laws are per se
constitutional.
D. The Religion Cases
A second argument in favor of the categorical constitutionality of
mention NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, in which a generally applicable common-law
cause of action was seen as offending the First Amendment when applied to expressive
conduct.
64
365 U.S. 127 (1961); 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
65
Cf. Turner Broadcasting v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 640-41 (1994) (“But while the
enforcement of a generally applicable law may or may not be subject to heightened
scrutiny under the First Amendment, compare Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. with Barnes v.
Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566-567 (1991), laws that single out the press, or certain
elements thereof, for special treatment ‘pose a particular danger of abuse by the State,’ and
so are always subject to at least some degree of heightened First Amendment scrutiny.”)
(some internal citations omitted).
66
501 U.S. at 671.
67
This reasoning made it unnecessary for the majority to decide whether promissory
estoppel law was purely content-neutral or facially content-neutral but content-based as
applied—the Court’s argument, which is that free speech rights may be waived, would
apply in either event.
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speech-neutral laws might operate by the analogy to religion-neutral laws.
Employment Division v. Smith,68 the argument would go, has held that
generally applicable laws (in the “religion-neutral” sense) don’t violate the
Free Exercise Clause; likewise, generally applicable laws (in the “speechneutral” sense) shouldn’t be seen as violating the Free Speech Clause.69
This analogy, I think, is weak. The Free Exercise Clause and the Free
Speech Clause protect different private interests and have long been
interpreted differently.70 The Free Exercise Clause, for instance, doesn’t
generally entitle people to inflict emotional distress on a public figure,
interfere with business relations, engage in anticompetitive conduct, breach
the peace, or interfere with the draft, even if the people feel religiously
compelled to do so. It probably wouldn’t have entitled people to do so even
in the decades between Sherbert v. Verner and Employment Division v.
Smith,71 when the Free Exercise Clause ostensibly provided religious
objectors with some exemptions from generally applicable laws.72 The Free
Speech Clause does let one do these things, if they’re done through the
communicative effect of one’s speech.
But to the extent that the Free Exercise Clause and the Free Speech
Clause are indeed analogous, the analogy actually cuts in favor of my
argument. With the Religion Clauses, too, some laws that are religionneutral on their face may still be unconstitutionally religion-based as
applied.
Consider, for instance, the law of intra-church disputes. Generally
applicable, religion-neutral laws, such as contract law, property law, and
wills and trusts law may generally be applied to resolve such disputes, with
68

494 U.S. 872 (1990).
Many commentators have noted the similarity between Cohen v. Cowles Media and
Employment Division v. Smith, though without taking the next step to argue that all facially
speech-neutral restrictions are per se constitutional by analogy to Smith (a step that I have
heard some people make in person, though not in print). See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe,
Disentangling Symmetries: Speech, Association, Parenthood, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 641, 650-51
(2001); Kristian D. Whitten, The Economics of Actual Malice, 32 CUMB. L. REV. 519, 570
(2001-02). Justice Scalia in Barnes v. Glen Theatres, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 579 (1991)
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment), does argue that facially speech-neutral rules are per
se constitutional, by analogy to Smith, but the law involved in Barnes was not just
generally applicable but also content-neutral as applied (at least in Justice Scalia’s view,
see id. at 574 n.2). Justice Scalia’s statement that “if the law is not directed against the
protected value (religion or expression) the law must be obeyed,” id., doesn’t indicate how
he would treat a law that’s generally applicable (and thus not directed against expression on
its face) but content-based, and thus directed against the content of expression, as applied.
70
See Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L.
REV. 1465, 1498-1501 (1999).
71
374 U.S. 398 (1963); 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
72
See, e.g., Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 460 (1971) (rejecting a claim that
the Free Exercise Clause mandates a religious exemption from the draft).
69
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no First Amendment problems. If I leave property to a church so long as
the church doesn’t use the property for manufacturing purposes, such a
condition can be enforced.73 But when the generally applicable will
interpretation rules would, as applied, require courts to make religious
judgments—for instance, if I leave property to a church so long as it
remains religiously orthodox and my heirs try to reclaim the property on the
grounds that the church has violated the condition—the Religion Clauses
prohibit courts from acting.74
Likewise, the law of fraud and false advertising is facially religionneutral, and may often be applicable to churches’ nonreligious claims. But
if the law as applied to a claim would require courts to evaluate the truth or
falsehood of a religious assertion, the Religion Clauses would prohibit such
an application.75
The same is likely true in other situations as well. Consider, for
instance, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. If you inflict
emotional distress on a pro-choice politician by using loudspeakers outside
his house at 3 a.m., you will have no Free Speech Clause defense.76
Likewise, even if you feel religiously compelled to remonstrate with the
politician this way, you will likely have no Free Exercise Clause defense.77
But if you inflict emotional distress on him using the content of speech,
for instance by publishing a vitriolic satire, that’s constitutionally protected
under the Free Speech Clause.78 Likewise, if a church inflicts emotional
distress on him by excommunicating him, that’s constitutionally protected
under the Free Exercise Clause. 79 Even if the excommunication causes
73

Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602-04 (1979) (concluding that civil courts may decide
church property disputes using “neutral principles” to interpret trust documents).
74
Id. at 602-04 (stressing that the “neutral principles” approach was permissible only
to the extent that a court can avoid “rely[ing] on religious precepts” and resolving
controversies related to “religious concepts” in the trust documents); Arkansas Presbytery
of Cumberland Presbyterian Church v. Hudson, 40 S.W.3d 301, 307 (Ark. 2001) (“Any
documents, such as the church constitution, pertinent to the dispute, must be scrutinized in
purely secular terms.”).
75
See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
76
See supra note 32.
77
See Heffron v. ISKCON, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (holding, even during the
Sherbert/Yoder era, when strict scrutiny was generally applied to religious exemption
claims, that religious observers’ rights to engage in religiously motivated speech are no
greater than secular speakers’ rights to engage in analogous secular speech).
78
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
79
Cf., e.g., Marks v. Estate of Hartgerink, 528 N.W.2d 539, 544-45 (Iowa 1995)
(refusing to recognize a tort of wrongful excommunication); Korean Presbyterian Church
v. Lee, 880 P.2d 565, 569-70 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (same); Murphy v. I.S.K.CON. of
New England, Inc., 571 N.E.2d 340, 346 (Mass. 1991) (rejecting intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim when the distress was caused by allegedly harmful religious
teachings; “Inherent in the claim that exposure to ISKCON N.E.’s religious beliefs causes
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severe emotional distress—as it may, especially if the politician or his
family believes that it will damn him to hell—and even if a jury finds that
the excommunication was outrageous, the excommunication is
constitutionally protected.
Emotional distress that flows from the religiosity of the offensive
conduct, like emotional distress that flows from the content of people’s
speech, thus may not form the basis of legal liability even under the
generally applicable emotional distress tort. Similarly, many child custody
cases have held that the facially religion-neutral “best interests of the child”
standard may sometimes violate the Free Exercise Clause: Courts may not
diminish the custody rights of a divorced parent because of the supposed
harmfulness of the religious doctrine that he’s teaching his children, unless
there’s serious evidence that the teaching is not just against the child’s “best
interests” but is actually likely to cause significant harm to the child.80
Again, I don’t want to claim too much of an analogy here: Some of the
cases cited above rely on the Free Exercise Clause,81 but others just talk
about the First Amendment generally;82 and the reasons for some of these
tortious emotional damages is the notion that the disputed beliefs are fundamentally flawed
and inconsistent with a proper notion of human development. While this issue may be the
subject of a theological or academic debate, it has no place in the courts of this
Commonwealth.”).
80
See, e.g., In re Marriage of Minix, 801 N.E.2d 1201, 1203, 1205 (Ill. App. 2003); In
re Marriage of Jensen-Branch, 899 P.2d 803, 808 (Wash. App. 1995); Pater v. Pater, 588
N.E.2d 794, 798 (Ohio 1992); Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1157 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1990); In re Marriage of Knighton, 723 S.W.2d 274, 282-83 (Tex. App. 1987). But see In
re Short, 698 P.2d 1310, 1313 (Colo. 1985) (concluding that courts applying the “best
interests of the child” standard can take into consideration the parents’ religious practices,
though acknowledging that even there “[c]ourts are precluded by the free exercise of
religion clause from weighing the comparative merits of the religious tenets of the various
faiths or basing its custody decisions solely on religious considerations”); LeDoux v.
LeDoux, 452 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Neb. 1990) (concluding that “The paramount consideration in
all cases involving the custody or visitation of a child is the best interests of the child,” and
that the parents’ religious practices may be considered when determining what is in the
child’s best interests); Rogers v. Rogers, 490 So.2d 1017, 1018-19 (Fla. App. 1986)
(likewise).
81
See Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in North
America, 344 U.S. 94, 107 (1952) (holding that interference with internal church affairs
violates “the free exercise of religion”); Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull
Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 448 (1969) (citing Kedroff for the same
proposition); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1944) (relying on the “freedom
of religious belief”).
82
See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979) (just talking about the First
Amendment); Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1157 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (talking
about both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause); In re Marriage of
Knighton, 723 S.W.2d 274, 277-78 (Tex. App. 1987) (likewise); see also Waites v. Waites,
567 S.W.2d 326, 331 n.2 (Mo. 1978) (reaching a similar result solely under the
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doctrines have more to do with fear of government entanglement with
theological questions than with concern about equal treatment as such.83 As
I mentioned, there’s no reason to expect Free Speech Clause doctrine to
track Religion Clauses doctrine perfectly.
Nonetheless, the Religion Clauses jurisprudence generally illustrates my
broader point: When constitutional doctrine prohibits laws that facially turn
on some factor—whether the factor is the content of speech or religious
judgments—the doctrine should also bar courts from considering the same
factor when applying generally applicable laws.84
E. Free Speech and the Constitutional Immunity for Persuasion,
Information, and Content-Based Offensiveness
1. The limited relevance of good government motives
The cases discussed in Part II.B reflect, I think, a coherent principle:
The First Amendment generally makes conveying facts and opinions into a
constitutionally immunized activity. Normally, the government may punish
people for causing various harms, directly or indirectly. But it generally
may not punish speakers when the harms are caused by what the speaker is
saying—by the persuasive, informative, or offensive force of the facts or
opinions that the speaker expressed.85
This is of course quite compatible with the Court’s general
jurisprudence of content-based restrictions; it just equally covers laws that
are content-based as applied and laws that are content-based on their face.
And this principle makes sense: As we see from the cases, a law that’s
content-based as applied (such as the Espionage Act involved in Schenck
and Debs) can restrict speech as much as a law that’s content-based on its
face. Moreover, such a law is indeed punishing the “speech element” of the
communication rather than some “nonspeech element.”86
Establishment Clause); Bonjour v. Bonjour, 592 P.2d 1233, 1241 (Alaska 1979) (likewise).
83
See, e.g., Jones, 443 U.S. at 603; Ballard, 322 U.S. at 87.
84
We see something similar even in Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence. Generally
applicable race-neutral laws are usually constitutional—but not when they’re race-based as
applied. Consider Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984), where the Court held
unconstitutional a child custody decision based on the mother’s having remarried someone
of another race: A best interests of the child standard is facially race-neutral, and usually
quite permissible; but when the harm to the child’s interests is said to flow from the
parent’s race, the Court recognizes that the application of the law involves race
discrimination.
85
Of course, unless the speech falls within the usual First Amendment exceptions,
such as incitement, false statements of fact, threats, and the like.
86
See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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The principle is in some tension, however, with the theory that the First
Amendment is chiefly aimed at preventing government actions that are
motivated by a desire to suppress speech.87 In the examples I gave above,
the lawmakers may have genuinely wanted to prevent a certain kind of
harm, and may have been quite indifferent to whether that harm is caused
by speech or by conduct. The drafters of the Espionage Act, for instance,
might have sincerely wanted to punish all interference with military
recruitment, whether through conduct or speech. But whether the Act was
well-motivated or not, it should have generally been unconstitutional when
applied to interference by persuasion.
In some of the examples I give above, one can argue that the law is open
to improper government motivations in its enforcement. For instance, the
“outrageousness” test in the emotional distress tort, the “offensive
behavior” test in breach of the peace laws, and the “offensive work
environment” test in workplace harassment law are quite vague.
Prosecutors, judges, and juries might well interpret them narrowly when
they agree with the speech, and broadly when they disagree with the speech.
But in other situations, the law is pretty clear. Public speech that
advocates draft resistance does seem likely to willfully obstruct
recruitment.88 A journal article that explains how fingerprint recognition
systems can be evaded89 does seem likely to facilitate certain crimes by
some readers. If applying the law to some such speech would violate the
First Amendment, the reason must flow from something other than the
87

See, e.g., Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose, supra note 22, at 413 (“First
Amendment law, as developed by the Supreme Court over the past several decades, has as
its primary, though unstated, object the discovery of improper governmental motives.”);
Kagan, When a Speech Code Is a Speech Code, supra note 15, at 965 & n.24, 968
(applying this approach to suggest that generally applicable policies banning hostile
environment harassment in universities should only be reviewed under O’Brien, even when
they’re applied to otherwise fully protected speech); Rubenfeld, supra note 13, at 784
(arguing that the Free Speech Clause is implicated “if and only if: (1) the law makes the
fact that [a person] was communicating an element of the prohibited offense; (2) the
legislative purpose was to target speech even though the prohibition is speech-neutral on its
face; or (3) the law was selectively enforced to target speech”). I say only “in some tension
with” because some of the scholars who urge a focus on motive acknowledge that “[s]ome
aspects of First Amendment law resist explanation in terms of motive,” Kagan, Private
Speech, Public Purpose, supra note 22, at 415. Since Professor Kagan’s claim is only that
“the concern with governmental motive [is] . . . the most important[] explanatory factor in
First Amendment law,” id. at 416, and “most important” is necessarily a subjective factor, I
leave it to the reader to decide whether the cases discussed above substantially undermine
that claim.
88
See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring);
Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 539-40 (D.D.C. 1917) (Learned Hand, J.).
89
See Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, supra note 3, at ___ n.___ (discussing such
an article).
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government’s motive, which may well be quite pure.90 So if the cases in
Part II.B are right, the constitutional problem lies in the law’s being
content-based as applied—in its punishing speech because of the persuasive
effect of the speech—and not in the government’s being motivated by a
desire to suppress speech rather than to prevent harm.
It’s true that the Supreme Court has at times said that “In determining
whether a regulation is content based or content neutral, we look to the
purpose behind the regulation.”91 But the Court has also acknowledged that
“while a content-based purpose may be sufficient in certain circumstances
to show that a regulation is content based, it is not necessary to such a
showing in all cases.”92 The better formulation is the one the Court has
often used: A content-neutral law is one that is “justified without reference
to the content of the regulated speech”93—and a law that is content-based as
applied is indeed justified, in that application, with reference to what the
speech communicates.94
90

Prosecutors may still have discretion in deciding whom to charge under those laws,
and they may exercise that discretion out of a desire to suppress certain viewpoints, rather
than to evenhandedly prevent the harm that the law is aimed at preventing. But that risk is
equally present for any law that may be applied to speech, including generally applicable
laws that are speech-neutral on their face and content-neutral as applied.
91
See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 526 (2001); Ward v. Rock Against Racism,
491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
92
Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 526 n.9 (quoting Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC,
512 U.S. 622, 642-643 (1994)).
93
See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 526 (2001); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S.
703, 719 (2000); U.S. v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 811 (2000);
United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 318 (1990); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491
U.S. 781, 791 (1989); TRIBE, supra note 39, at 789; John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A
Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1496-1502 (1975); Stone, supra note 25, at 211-17 (taking a similar
view, but limited to those restrictions where the communicative impact consists of
persuading, informing, or offending people).
94
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989), a prison speech case, did interpret a
“content-neutrality” rule as focusing on the government’s ultimate motive rather than
whether the rule restricted speech based on its content. The Court upheld a restriction on
speech with certain kinds of content (for instance, information on weapons construction or
alcohol production, encouragement of escape or other crimes, or “sexually explicit
material” and especially homosexually themed material that “poses a threat to the security,
good order, or discipline of the institution”) on the ground that it was “neutral” in the sense
of being ultimately justified by an interest in prison security, rather than by dislike for
certain viewpoints. Id. at 415-16. If a similar rule were applied outside prisons, then a
wide range of speech restrictions—for instance, bans on advocacy of violence, draft
evasion, sexism, and so on—would be treated as “content-neutral” simply because the
government’s ultimate purpose is to prevent harmful conduct. Fortunately, this approach
seems to be limited to restrictions on prisoner speech; Thornburgh itself stressed that it was
applying an unusual definition of neutrality (“the technical sense in which we meant and
used that term [‘neutral’] in Turner [v. Safley],” id. at 415-16).
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2. Content-based applications vs. content-neutral applications
a. The problem
This still leaves something of a question: Why, exactly, should a
generally applicable law that is content-based as applied be treated
differently from a generally applicable law that is content-neutral as
applied? The Court probably would not and should not have intervened if
Hustler had inflicted emotional distress on Falwell by using loud bullhorns
outside Falwell’s house. Nor would there be any First Amendment
violation if the NAACP had been sued for organizing a demonstration that
blocked the entrance to Claiborne Hardware’s door, or if Schenck had been
prosecuted for interfering with the draft by blocking a draft board office.
But why? The law, and thus the lawmakers’ motivation for enacting the
law, would be the same in these hypotheticals as in the real cases. The
law’s effect would be the same: The law as applied would restrict speech.
What then is left to explain the difference? And if indeed the lawmakers’
motivation doesn’t have the importance that some assign to it, then what is
the difference even between facially content-based laws and facially
content-neutral ones? There are, I think, two main answers to this—a
conceptual one and a pragmatic one.
b. The conceptual distinction
Under nearly every theory of free speech, the right to free speech is at
its core the right to communicate—to persuade and to inform people
through the content of what a speaker says. The right must also generally
include in considerable measure the right to offend people through the
content of one’s message, since much speech that persuades some people
also offends others.95
Persuading and informing people may certainly cause harm; the
listeners might be persuaded to do harmful things. But the premise of
modern First Amendment law is that the government generally may not
95

There might be some limits on this right to offend, for instance if (1) the speaker is
communicating to someone who has already said that he doesn’t want to hear the message,
and (2) the speaker can stop speaking to this unwilling listener, while still continuing to try
to persuade or inform other potentially willing listeners. Cf. Rowan v. Post Office Dep’t,
397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970) (adopting this view as to unwanted mailings sent to people’s
homes); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 486 (1988) (adopting this view as to residential
picketing, though in my view not so persuasively as in Rowan); Eugene Volokh, Comment,
Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1791, 1863-66 (1992)
(suggesting such an approach as to hostile environment harassment law).
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(with limited exceptions) punish speech because of a fear, even a justified
fear, that people will make the wrong decisions based on that speech.
“The people in our democracy are entrusted with the responsibility for
judging and evaluating the relative merits of conflicting arguments. . . . [I]f
there be any danger that the people cannot evaluate the information and
arguments advanced [by speakers], it is a danger contemplated by the
Framers of the First Amendment.”96 Punishing speech because its content
persuades, informs, or offends thus conflicts especially seriously with the
free speech guarantee, more so than punishing speech for reasons unrelated
to its potential persuasive, informative, or offensive effect.
c. Practical effects
i. Content-based restrictions as likely greater burdens on speech
This conceptual distinction may itself help explain the Court’s
judgments both as to facially content-based laws and as to laws that are
content-based only as applied.97 But it also reflects the likelihood that
allowing content-based restrictions (whether they are facially content-based
or content-based as applied) is likely to end up burdening speech more than
allowing content-neutral restrictions would. 98
To begin with, a typical law aimed at noncommunicative effects is
unlikely to excessively inhibit the communication of some viewpoint or
fact, because many different media would remain available to the
speakers.99 For instance, even a total ban on leafleting, justified by the
96

First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791-92 (1978); see also Linmark Assocs.
v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 (1977); Stone, Content Regulation and the
First Amendment, supra note 34, at 213; Dale Carpenter, The Antipaternalism Principle in
the First Amendment, ___ CREIGHTON L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2004).
97
See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1969) (distinguishing
restrictions aimed at the “speech” elements of expressive conduct from those aimed its
“nonspeech” elements); Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972).
98
I’ll use these terms as roughly interchangeable with restrictions triggered by the
communicative effects of speech and restrictions triggered by the noncommunicative
effects, though there might be some differences in some situations.
Some commentators have also argued that content-based restrictions are more
dangerous than content-neutral ones because they often distort public debate, by burdening
one side of a debate while allowing another to be heard free of any such burden. See, e.g.,
Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, supra note 22, at 217-27. Others
have disagreed. See, e.g., Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose, supra note 22, at 44551. My analysis neither relies on nor rejects the distortion argument—I focus on whether a
restriction is likely to substantially interfere (as opposed to only modestly interfere) with
the expression of certain facts or viewpoints, not on whether it’s likely to interfere more
with one side of the debate than with another.
99
See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 75
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desire to prevent litter, would still leave people free to communicate their
views by the many media that don’t create litter—by displaying signs, by
using radio broadcasts, by advertising in newspapers, and so on.
The leafleting ban would indeed interfere with public debate, in my
view too much. But it can’t entirely drive certain views from public debate,
or even come close to it. Moreover, because the content-neutral law can
potentially apply to a wide range of speakers, its scope will likely be limited
by political forces.100 The most severe hypothetical content-neutral laws—
for instance, a ban on printing, justified by the environmental harms caused
by the process of making paper101—are thus sure to remain just
hypotheticals: They are politically implausible precisely because they
burden so much speech.
On the other hand, a content-based restriction, whether facially contentbased or content-based as applied, can outlaw most expression of certain
facts or opinions. If a law—such as the laws in Schenck or Claiborne—
bans any conduct that may cause a certain harm, and that harm can be
caused by people’s being persuaded to act in certain ways, then any
viewpoints that have the potential for such persuasion (the draft is evil,
blacks should boycott white-owned businesses) would end up being largely
prohibited. Because the law focuses either on the content of the speech, or
on the harm that the speech causes, it can block the speech in all media.
And because it’s limited to a narrow range of speech, it may face less
political opposition than broader bans might provoke.102
(1987) (“[E]ven in such cases [where a content-neutral restriction has a strong contentdifferential effect], the harm that can flow from judicial miscalculation is limited. Contentneutral restrictions usually limit the availability of only particular means of expression.
They are thus unlikely substantially to block the communication of particular messages.”).
100
See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 336-37 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (“the best protection against governmental attempts to
squelch opposition . . . [has been] the requirement that the government act through contentneutral means that restrict expression the government favors as well as expression it
disfavors”).
101
See Robert Post, Encryption Source Code and the First Amendment, 14 BERK.
TECH. L.J. 713, 722-23 (2000) (suggesting as an example a law that bans newsprint to save
trees); cf. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 99, at 58 (suggesting as an
example a law that would neutrally ban all speeches, leaflets, newspapers, magazines, and
radio or television broadcasts).
102
Of course, restrictions on popular conduct, or on conduct engaged in by a politically
powerful minority, may indeed face serious political opposition. But conduct restrictions
in a democracy tend to ban only unpopular conduct, such as interference with the war effort
(as in Schenck), and with it equally unpopular speech. Such generally applicable
restrictions may therefore be fairly easy to enact, since they target only a relatively small
and unpopular group. Content-neutral restrictions on speech (such as leafleting or
picketing), on the other hand, would restrict many political groups from all over the
political spectrum. If such content-neutral restrictions are too burdensome, they would thus
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Even a narrower content-based restriction, such as the law involved in
Cohen v. California or Hustler v. Falwell, can be quite burdensome. True,
because the restriction restricts only the words one can use (in Cohen) or the
level of vitriol (in Hustler), it wouldn’t broadly prohibit the expression of a
particular fact or idea. But, as Justice Harlan rightly concluded in Cohen,
even such restrictions can seriously interfere with people’s ability to express
the “otherwise inexpressible emotions” that only certain kinds of words can
effectively capture.103 Harsh contempt for a policy (the draft) or a person
(Jerry Falwell) is itself a viewpoint that’s subtly different from mildmannered condemnation, and prohibitions on harsh language seriously
interfere with the ability to convey this viewpoint.
ii. The limits of the “ample alternative channels” inquiry, both as to
content-neutral and content-based restrictions
I have argued that content-based restrictions are dangerous because they
risk broadly suppressing certain viewpoints or facts. But one could respond
that, instead of presumptively prohibiting content-based speech restrictions,
courts could try to prevent serious burdens on speech the same way they do
with content-neutral restrictions—by asking whether the restrictions leave
open “ample alternative channels” for expression.104 I think, though, that
the Court has been right to reject such proposals,105 and to treat contentbased restrictions as presumptively unconstitutional without an inquiry into
how much the restriction burdens speech or into whether it leaves open
ample alternative channels.
To begin with, the record of the ample alternative channels inquiry in
the content-neutral restriction test hasn’t been very good. The Court has at
times applied it in a demanding manner, for instance insisting that
alternative channels aren’t ample if they materially raise the price of
speaking, make it harder for speakers to reach the same listeners, or subtly
influence the content of the message by changing the medium.106 But at
other times, the Justices have treated this requirement as only a weak
constraint.107 And this is to be expected, given the vagueness of the term
likely arouse a wide range of opposition, which provides a natural political check on their
scope.
103
403 U.S. 15, 25-26 (1971).
104
See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 56-57 (1994).
105
See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 879-80 (1997); City of Cincinnati v.
Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410, 430 (1993); Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Public
Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 537-38(1980).
106
Id. at 56-57.
107
See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 53-54 (1986)
(holding that a zoning law that banned adult theaters from 95% of the land in a city left
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“ample.”
In fact, the chief practical limit on content-neutral restrictions has not
been the “ample alternative channels” inquiry, but the political reality I
mentioned above:
Most practically enactable restrictions on the
noncommunicative aspects of speech do leave open fairly substantial
alternative channels for expressing the same ideas. So even if the Court
underenforces the ample alternative channels prong, few views or subjects
will likely be broadly silenced.108
But it’s much more likely that a politically feasible restriction on the
communicative aspects of speech will substantially block people from
expressing a particular viewpoint. That’s so even if the restriction has to be
framed as facially viewpoint-neutral, or even as speech-neutral—consider,
for instance, the Espionage Act in Schenck. So judicial underenforcement
of the ample alternative channels prong for content-based restrictions would
be much more dangerous than it is for content-neutral restraints.
iii. The limits of the “ample alternative channels” inquiry as to contentbased restrictions
So underenforcement of the ample alternative channels prong is
especially likely to yield serious harms to free speech if the prong were
applied to content-based restrictions. But there’s also more reason to worry
that the prong would indeed be underenforced when applied to contentbased restrictions (whether they are facially content-based or content-based
as applied).
“Ample” is a vague term, and one that requires contestable predictions
about the law’s effects on a complex system of speakers and listeners.
There is a large gray area in which the quality of the alternative channels
open ample alternative channels, though this apparently substantially increased the likely
expense of renting or buying space, and likely made the theaters less accessible); Members
of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 812 & n.13 (1984) (holding
that a ban on posting leaflets on city-owned utility poles left open ample alternative
channels, though the alternatives seemed likely to be considerably more expensive);
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 544 (2001) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (articulating
and applying the test for content-neutral speech restrictions without even mentioning the
ample alternative channels inquiry, in a case where the speech restriction probably left
open very few realistic channels for communicating the facts that the speaker wanted to
communicate); Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994)
(articulating and applying the test for content-neutral speech restrictions without even
mentioning the ample alternative channels inquiry); cf. JAMES WEINSTEIN, HATE SPEECH,
PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE RADICAL ATTACK ON FREE SPEECH DOCTRINE 35, 39 (1999)
(pointing out that content-neutral restrictions are nearly always upheld).
108
See Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, supra note 34
, at 226;
supra note 99.
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would be hard to estimate. And when the restriction will likely cover only a
particular message—pro-boycott speech, anti-draft speech, and so on—the
normal risk of judicial error and deliberate or subconscious prejudice
becomes magnified, because the judges know well which side of the
political debate will lose and which will win as a result of their decision.109
In such a scenario, it’s especially likely that judges will apply the vague
“ample alternative channels” standard in a way that’s not protective enough
of unpopular speakers. It’s probably no accident that the low water mark of
the requirement, City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,110 involved a
restriction that was limited to sexually themed speech, even though the
Court treated it as content-neutral.111
Moreover, one restriction aimed at the communicative impact of certain
speech is likely to be followed by other such restrictions. Content-based
restrictions don’t appear randomly: They arise because some fairly
powerful political group (in government or out of it), believes a certain kind
of speech is dangerous—or, as to laws that are content-based as applied,
believes that all conduct that’s likely to cause certain effects is dangerous.
If this group succeeds in restricting, say, Communist speech in some
contexts, it seems likely that it will also want to restrict Communist speech
in other contexts. If a movement tries to restrict bigoted speech in
workplaces, perhaps using generally applicable hostile work environment
harassment law, it will also likely try to use similar educational and public
accommodations harassment rules to restrict speech in educational
institutions or places of public accommodation.112 (That has in fact been
the pattern of restrictions on Communist advocacy, antiwar speech, sexually
themed speech, pro-civil-rights speech, and racist speech.)
Each success will help validate the pro-restriction group’s positions in
the eyes of voters and legislators who are on the fence.113 Moreover, each
success may reinforce the enthusiasm of the supporters of the
109

See Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, supra note 34, at 225
(“judicial evaluations of viewpoint-based restrictions are especially likely to ‘become
involved with the ideological predispositions of those doing the evaluating’”) (quoting
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 112 (1980)); WEINSTEIN, supra note 107, at
40 (noting this risk of judicial viewpoint discrimination, whether deliberate or
subconscious).
110
475 U.S. 41, 53-54 (1986) .
111
Id. at 46-49.
112
See Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Cyberspace, Harassment Law, and the Clinton
Administration, supra note 7.
113
See Eugene Volokh, Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026,
1077-1105 (2003) (describing such “attitude-altering slippery slopes”); Daniel A. Farber,
Content Regulation and the First Amendment: A Revisionist View, 68 GEO. L.J. 727, 73738 (1980) (noting that content-based classifications may “stigmatiz[e] the categories they
single out for special treatment”).
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restrictions.114 And government restrictions on such speech are also likely
to be accompanied by private restrictions on such speech, for instance by
private broadcasters, publishers, employers, and commercial property
owners.
This means that even when each restriction standing alone imposes only
a modest burden on speech, the aggregate of all the restrictions can end up
being quite burdensome. It is, of course, possible for courts to consider this
risk, to allow only the first few restrictions, and then to strike down any new
restrictions once the alternative channels seem to no longer be ample. But
that’s a hard project for courts to engage in, especially when they are armed
only with a vague standard like “ample alternative channels.”
Judges may find it hard to explain why two seemingly similar
restrictions are being treated differently, just because of the order in which
they were enacted. And because “ample” lacks an objective absolute
definition, courts may end up applying a relative criterion—how many
channels the restriction leaves open compared to those available before this
restriction was enacted, or how many it leaves open compared to those that
it shuts down. If that’s so, then courts might indeed allow a sequence of
restrictions that gradually substantially reduces the alternative channels,
even if the courts would have struck down a restriction that tried to impose
the same burden at once.115
d. Conclusion
For all these reasons, the Court has been right to treat restrictions that
114

See id. at 1121-27 (describing such “political momentum slippery slopes”).
See id. at 1105-14 (describing such “small change tolerance slippery slopes”).
This tendency might also occur with restrictions aimed at the noncommunicative
impact of speech. A billboard ban, a home sign ban, or a leafleting ban, for instance, may
be part of a broader movement that values calm and esthetics above free speech. See
Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 99, at 74 (observing that government
officials “are usually deeply committed to the maintenance of order and the conservation of
resources,” which may lead them to systematically support even content-neutral speech
restrictions that seem to make public places calmer, or diminish the government’s
administrative or police protection burdens). Such a movement may indeed end up
yielding a sequence of these sorts of restrictions.
Still, this seems considerably less likely than with restrictions aimed at the
communicative impact of speech. First, the movement will be more likely to run up
against political opposition from a range of speakers, including some possibly fairly
popular ones. Second, the restrictions are less likely to draw from the same base of
support: For instance, many people who hate billboards will likely not be as troubled by
leaflets or signs on people’s homes, since the noncommunicative impact of these media is
quite different. People who want to suppress Communist or racist speech, on the other
hand, are more likely to want to suppress it in a wide range of media and locations.
115
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are content-based as applied—even if they are facially generally applicable
to both speech and conduct—just like restrictions that are content-based on
their face. It’s the only approach that’s consistent with cases such as
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, and the
others. It’s properly hostile to the government’s attempts to restrict speech
because of the informative or persuasive power of the speech. And it’s
necessary to prevent the government from being able to broadly suppress
certain facts and ideas.
When speech is punished precisely because of what it communicates—
for instance, because it may persuade people to violate the law or to boycott
someone, because it may offend some listeners, or because it may convey
information that helps people commit crimes—the law is operating as a
content-based speech restriction. It is restricting speech precisely because
of what it speaks, and it must therefore be subjected to serious First
Amendment analysis. We ought not dodge this analysis by simply
relabeling the speech as “conduct.”
III.

SPEECH “BRIGADED WITH ACTION,” SPEECH AS AN ILLEGAL
“COURSE OF CONDUCT,” AND SPEECH AS A “SPEECH ACT”
A. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.

“It rarely has been suggested,” Justice Black wrote for the Court in
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., in 1949, “that the constitutional
freedom for speech and press extends its immunity to speech or writing
used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal
statute.”116 “It has never been deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech
or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was
in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either
spoken, written, or printed.”117 Likewise, Justice Black joined two opinions
characterizing Giboney as stating that speech may be punished when it’s
“brigaded with illegal action.”118 Others have described the Giboney
principle as authorizing restrictions on speech that is tantamount to a
“speech act[].”119
116

336 U.S. 490, 498, 502 (1949).
Id. at 502.
118
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 514 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Garrison
v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 82 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring); see also Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 456 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (not joined by Justice Black on
this point).
119
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 17, at text accompanying nn.55-60; Rice v.
Paladin Press, Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 248 (4th Cir. 1997). Occasionally, as in the arguments
about crime-facilitating speech, the Giboney argument may overlap with the “generally
117
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Giboney used this reasoning to uphold an injunction against peaceful
picketers who were trying to pressure a business “to agree to stop selling ice
to nonunion peddlers.”120 Such an agreement, the Court said, would have
violated Missouri trade restraint law, and enjoining such picketing therefore
didn’t violate the First Amendment. But the Giboney argument has also
been used to justify many other kinds of speech restrictions as well:
(a) The Justice Department121 and a court of appeals122 have recently
reasoned that Giboney lets the government restrict books that may
inform people how to violate the law, at least when the publisher
intends that those books help people commit crimes.
(b) Justice Goldberg’s majority opinion in Cox v. Louisiana described
Giboney as supporting the proposition that “[a] man may be
applicable law” argument; but the Giboney argument is sometimes used even to defend
laws that explicitly restrict speech, such as laws prohibiting the solicitation of crime.
120
336 U.S. at 492.
121

[I]t is hard to imagine that the First Amendment would permit culpability or
liability for publication of other bombmaking manuals that have a propensity to be
misused by some unknown, unidentified segment of the readership, since sources
of the same information inevitably will remain in the public domain, readily
available to persons who wish to manufacture and use explosives.
On the other hand, the constitutional analysis is radically different where the
publica tion or expression of information is “brigaded with action,” in the form of
what are commonly called “speech acts.” If the speech in question is an integral
part of a transaction involving conduct the government otherwise is empowered to
prohibit, such “speech acts” typically may be proscribed without much, if any,
concern about the First Amendment, since it is merely incidental that such
“conduct” takes the form of speech. “‘[I]t has never been deemed an abridgement
of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because
the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language,
either spoken, written, or printed.’” Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S.
447, 456 (1978) (quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490,
502 (1949)).
, at text accompanying n.56. Despite the opening
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 17
sentence of the quote, the Justice Department used this argument to defend the
constitutionality of a ban on “publication of . . . bombmaking manuals that have a
propensity to be misused by some unknown, unidentified segment of the readership,” so
long as the ban was limited to publishers who were “motivated by a desire to facilitate the
unlawful use of explosives.” Id. at text accompanying n.68.
122
Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 243 (4th Cir. 1997) (relying on
Giboney in allowing liability for publishing a book that described how contract murders
can be committed); United States v. Savoie, 594 F. Supp. 678, 682 (W.D. La. 1984)
(relying on Giboney in issuing injunction against, among other things, “distributing any
document or other information to be used by taxpayers to avoid the payment of, or to
obtain the refund of, federal income taxes, that is based on the false proposition that wages,
salaries or other forms of compensation for labor or services not specifically excluded from
taxation under Title 26 of the United States Code are not taxable income”).
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punished for encouraging the commission of a crime.”123 The Court
cited as an example Fox v. Washington, a 1915 case that upheld the
punishment of a newspaper editor who endorsed the propriety of
nudism.124
Some courts have likewise recently used Giboney to defend
restrictions on doctors’ recommending medicinal marijuana to their
patients.125
Courts have similarly used the “conduct not speech” argument to
justify restricting speech that creates an offensive work
environment.126
Courts have relied on Giboney to support restrictions on speech that
urges political boycotts aimed at pressuring governments to change
their policies.127
A state administrative agency has relied on Giboney to justify a

379 U.S. 559, 563 (1965).
236 U.S. 273 (1915). See also State v. Musser, 175 P.2d 724, 731 (Utah 1946)
(upholding criminal punishment for conspiracy to teach the propriety of polygamy, on the
theory that “Expressions and the use of words may constitute verbal acts,” and therefore
“an agreement to advocate, teach, counsel, advise and urge other persons to practice
polygamy and unlawful cohabitation, is an agreement to commit acts injurious to public
morals within the scope of the conspiracy statute”) (emphasis in original), vacated and
remanded, 333 U.S. 95 (1948); Rubenfeld, supra note 13, at 827-29 (likewise justifying
Brandenburg v. Ohio on the grounds that incitement intended to and likely to cause
imminent illegal conduct is “participat[ion] in[] that course of conduct”).
125
Conant v. McCaffrey, 172 F.R.D. 681, 698 (N.D. Cal. 1997); Pearson v. McCaffrey, 139 F. Supp. 2d 113, 121 (D.D.C. 2001); see also Petition for Certiorari, Walters v.
Conant, No. 03-40, at 20 (U.S. filed June 7, 2003, by the Solicitor General). But see
Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 637-38 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding such speech
constitutionally protected). These particular restrictions might be justifiable under a
possible professional-client speech exception, see infra text accompanying notes 245-256,
though I’m not sure that this is so.
126
Jarman v. City of Northlake, 950 F. Supp. 1375, 1379 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (not citing
Giboney, but reasoning that “verbal acts of sexual harassment are not protected speech”);
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 860 F. Supp. 1486, 1535 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (not citing
Giboney, but reasoning that “[pornographic] pictures and verbal harassment are not
protected speech because they act as discriminatory conduct in the form of a hostile work
environment”); see also Robert A. Sedler, The Unconstitutionality of Campus Bans on
“Racist Speech:” The View From Without and Within, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 631, 673 n.159,
674 (1993) (taking a similar view, at least to speech by supervisors).
127
See Missouri v. National Org. for Women, 620 F.2d 1301, 1324 n.15 (8th Cir.
1980) (Gibson, C.J., dissenting) (arguing, citing Giboney, that NOW’s advocacy of a
boycott of Missouri businesses, aimed at getting Missouri to ratify the Equal Rights
Amendment, might be constitutionally punishable as an antitrust law violation); Searle v.
Johnson, 646 P.2d 682, 685 (Utah 1982) (holding, citing Giboney, that state Human
Society’s advocacy of a tourist boycott of a county, aimed at getting the county to improve
its dog pound, could be constitutionally punishable as interference with prospective
business advantage).
124
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restriction on racially offensive business names.128
(g) The dissent in Cohen v. California (joined by Justice Black) cited
Giboney to argue that wearing a jacket containing the phrase “Fuck
the Draft” should be constitutionally unprotected: “Cohen’s absurd
and immature antic was mainly conduct and little speech.”129
B. But What Exactly Does Giboney Mean?
These applications of Giboney may seem puzzling, and in many respects
inconsistent with recent First Amendment cases, such as Cohen,
Brandenburg v. Ohio, and NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware.130 And this is
so because the logic of Giboney itself is puzzling, and inconsistent with the
logic of the more recent Supreme Court cases. In particular, none of the
obvious interpretations of Giboney’s rather ambiguous language makes
much sense.
1. “Course of conduct” referring to the noncommunicative harms of
speech
The modern Supreme Court caselaw has, of course, recognized a sort of
conduct/speech distinction: Speech or expressive conduct may be restricted
because of harms flowing from its noncommunicative component (noise,
obstruction of traffic, and the like)—which one might view as its “conduct”
element—but not because of harms flowing from its communicative
component, the “speech” element.131 This is the now-standard distinction
128

In re Urban League of R.I. v. Sambo’s of R.I., Inc., R.I. Comm. for Hum. Rts., Nos.
79 PRA 074-06/06, 073-06/06, at 9 (Mar. 16, 1981) (relying partly on Giboney to conclude
that the name “Sambo’s Restaurants” violated public accommodations laws because it was
offensive to blacks). But see Sambo’s Restaurants, Inc. v. City of Ann Arbor, 663 F.2d 686
(6th Cir. 1981) (stating that use of the name was protected by the First Amendment even if
it was offensive to black customers); Sambo’s v. City Council of City of Toledo, 466 F.
Supp. 177 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (holding that it was unconstitutional for a city to deny sign
permits to Sambo’s because of its name).
129
403 U.S. 15, 27 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
130
Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Cohen is of course inconsistent with the majority’s
result. The approval in Cox of restrictions on speech that urges illegal conduct is
inconsistent with Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). The approval of restrictions
on speech urging boycotts is inconsistent with NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S.
886 (1982).
131
See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1969). Occasionally, Giboney is
indeed cited as supporting this conduct/speech distinction, and there it poses little
difficulty. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965) (citing Giboney for the
proposition that the law may bar “cordon[ing] off a street[] or entrance to a public or
private building,” or might even nondiscriminatorily “forbid[] all access to streets and other
public facilities for parades and meetings,” in order to prevent, for instance, interference

1-Sep- 04]

SPEECH AS CONDUCT

37

embodied in United States v. O’Brien and the many cases that rely on it.
But this can’t be the distinction Giboney, or the cases mentioned above
that cite Giboney, is using: All those cases, including Giboney, involve
speech that’s restricted because of harms that flow from its content.
2. Conduct “evidenced . . . by means of language”
Nor are the cases simply relying on Giboney’s assertion that conduct
can be punished even though it is “in part . . . evidenced . . . by means of
language.” Speech can indeed be used as evidence of prohibited conduct, or
of a punishable intent that accompanies prohibited conduct. A person’s
expression of pro-Nazi opinions, for instance, may be evidence that the
reason he helped a Nazi saboteur was to aid the Nazi cause.132
But this likewise doesn’t explain any of the casesmentioned above , nor
Giboney itself. In all those cases, it is the speech that’s being punished, not
some other behavior of which speech is just the evidence.
3. “[I]llegal” “course of conduct” meaning speech that itselfviolates a law
One could try to explain the opinions that rely on Giboney by reasoning
that the speech—picketing to achieve a certain result, advocating nudism,
wearing profanities on one’s jacket, publishing a book describing how to
commit a crime—violates a law, and in that sense becomes an “illegal”
with traffic); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 325 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting) (citing
Giboney for the proposition that private property owners may use trespass law to remove
speakers from their property).
The Court has also at times suggested that some conduct is so unlike the traditional
media of communication that it should be viewed as entirely outside the First Amendment,
perhaps even when it’s being restricted for its communicative effects. See O’Brien, 391
U.S. at 376 (“We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can
be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to
express an idea.”); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293
(1984) (citing the above-cited page from O’Brien, and stating that “We assume for present
purposes, but do not decide,” that overnight sleeping in a park to protest against
homelessness may qualify as expressive conduct); WEINSTEIN, supra note 107, at 32
(1999) (taking a similar view). But see Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt,
703 F.3d 586, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (rejecting the view that “sleeping
is or can ever be seen for Fist Amendment purposes,” when the restriction on sleeping is
aimed at the noncommunicative impact of the conduct, but reasoning that a “law directed at
the communicative nature of conduct” must still face First Amendment scrutiny), rev’d sub
nom. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984). This, though,
wouldn’t apply to the examples in this Part, which involve traditional forms of expression
(conversation, books, picketing, and the like).
132
See Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631, 641-42 (1947); see also Wisconsin v.
Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 489 (1993).
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“course of conduct.” Likewise, one article suggests (though without citing
Giboney) that “speech that amounts to the commission of an independently
illegal act,” such as “bribery, perjury, and threats,” is constitutionally
unprotected because it “is properly treated as action, even if it consists
solely of words.”133
But the point of modern First Amendment law is that speech is
sometimes protected even though it violates a law that restricts it. Speech
that violates a latter-day Sedition Act,134 public profanity (as in Cohen v.
California), and speech “encouraging the commission of a crime” (as in
Cox v. Louisiana) would indeed be “illegal” “course[s] of conduct” under
laws that prohibit such speech. Such laws, though, are still speech
restrictions, and are still rightly judged—and often struck down—under the
First Amendment.135
Perjury is no less speech, and no more action, than was speech in
violation of the Sedition Act, another form of falsehood that the law has
sought to punish. It may be speech in a particular context, such as in court
or in an official form, but it is still communication that is punished because
of what it communicates. Perjury and threats should indeed be punishable,
but because they fall within an exception to free speech protection, not
because they are somehow not speech.136
133

Cass R. Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 795, 836-37, 839
(1993) (also theorizing that in such situations “The words do not cause the act. The words
are the act.”). Professor Sunstein’s argument may well rest on an implicit theory about
which words are unprotected because they’re acts, and which are protected even though
they are acts (for instance, the act of sedition, encouragement of crime, and so on); but the
portions of the article that I quote unfortunately do not make such a theory explicit.
134
1 Stat. 596 (1798); Sedition Act of 1918, 40 Stat. 553 (1918), repealed by Act of
Mar. 3, 1921, ch. 136, 41 Stat. 1359.
135
See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (holding that encouraging the
commission of crime is not punishable except when the encouragement is intended to and
likely to cause imminent illegal conduct); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
288-92 (1964) (holding that seditious libel is not punishable); id. at 269 (condemning
attempts to restrict speech that rely simply on “epithets” or “labels” such as “insurrection,
contempt, advocacy of unlawful acts, breach of the peace, obscenity, solicitation of legal
business, and the various other formulae for the repression of expression”). Sunstein,
supra note 133, at 837, takes the view that advocacy of crime—even including punishable
incitement—is speech rather than “action,” but doesn’t explain how a criminally
punishable threat (action, in the article’s view) and criminally punishable incitement (not
action) would differ in this respect.
136
For perjury, the exception would be the one for knowingly false statements of fact.
See New York Times v. Sullivan (stating that such statements are generally unprotected,
unless they are seditious libel against the government); Illinois ex rel. Madigan v.
Telemarketing Associates, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1829, 1841 (2003) (holding the same as to
statements that aren’t defamatory but are fraudulent); quote accompanying note 209
(likewise stressing that perjury laws are speech restrictions). Bribery might indeed involve
action—the transfer of money—as well as speech, or might be punishable on the grounds
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4. “[I]llegal” “course of conduct” meaning speech violating a generally
applicable law
Some, though not all, of the cases that cite Giboney might be explained
on the grounds that the speech violates a generally applicable law that bans
a wide range of conduct including speech.137 This, though, would just
reduce the Giboney principle to the principle described and criticized in Part
II.
5. “Conduct” referring to a broader course of illegal behavior by the
speaker
“[C]ourse of conduct” “in part initiated . . . or carried out by means of
language” might be read as referring to some course of behavior that
consists of both speech and other illegal behavior (or planned illegal
behavior) by the speaker. If I’m planning to kill someone at a particular
place, and I lure him there by telling him to meet me there, then I might
well be guilty of attempted murder, though my behavior partly consists of
communication.138 This, though, wouldn’t fit the facts of Giboney, where
the defendants were simply speaking. Nor would it fit any of the other
cases described above, where the speakers were likewise simply
communicating, and not engaging in any nonspeech conduct.
6. “Conduct” referring to a broader course of illegal behavior by people
other than the speaker
One might therefore read “course of conduct” “in part initiated . . . or
carried out by means of language” as referring to the aggregate of the
speaker’s speech and the conduct of people whom the speech might affect.
If the course of conduct includes illegality, the theory would go, then the
speech part of the course of conduct would be just as illegal as the action
that the speech brings about. This might fit the facts of Giboney, where the
speaker was trying to pressure the employer into acting illegally, and of
some of the lower court cases that cite Giboney.
that it involves a promise, which may be properly restrictable. See infra text accompanying
notes 228-232.
137
See, e.g., Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 243 (4th Cir. 1997).
138
Cf. Aiken v. Wilson, 195 U.S. 194, 206 (1904) (“The most innocent and
constitutionally protected of acts or omissions may be made a step in a criminal plot, and if
it is a step in a plot, neither its innocence nor the Constitution is sufficient to prevent the
punishment of the plot by law.”).
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But such a reading would be inconsistent with Brandenburg v. Ohio,
and with the modern repudiation of cases such as Schenck and Debs.
Schenck’s and Debs’s speech, for instance, would be protected today under
the Brandenburg test, though both speakers were convicted for trying to
produce some illegal nonspeech behavior—the crime of draft evasion—on
the part of others.139 Brandenburg shows that speech is protected even
when it tries to trigger illegal behavior by listeners, except for the unusual
situations where the speech is intended to and likely to produce imminent
lawless conduct. So if Giboney ever meant that speech may be restricted
when it can indirectly bring about illegal conduct, that meaning has been
overruled by Brandenburg.
7. “Conduct . . . carried out by means of language” referring to threat of
action
Giboney might be interpreted as standing for the rather narrow
proposition that threats of conduct may be constitutionally unprotected. In
addition to advocating a boycott, and advocating that Empire Storage & Ice
stop dealing with nonunion ice peddlers, the picketers in Giboney made two
sorts of threats: the threat of a boycott (essentially “Stop dealing with
nonunion ice peddlers, or our friends will stop dealing with you”) and the
threat that union members who crossed the picket line would be ejected
from their union.
The Court seemed to rest its judgment partly on these threats. The
Justices argued that “all of appellants’ activities—their powerful
transportation combination, their patrolling, their formation of a picket line
warning union men not to cross at peril of their union membership, their
publicizing—constituted a single and integrated course of conduct, which
was in violation of Missouri’s valid law.”140 In doing so, the Court
reasoned, “appellants were doing more than exercising a right of free speech
or press” because “[t]hey were exercising their economic power together
with that of their allies.”141 This “exercising . . . economic power” might
have been referring to threatening to use one’s economic power to pressure
people into changing their behavior.
Likewise, consider two early 1980s opinions citing Giboney. Searle v.
Johnson held that the Humane Society’s advocacy of a boycott of a Utah
county, aimed at getting the county to improve its dog pound, was
unprotected speech that could be punished under the interference with
139

Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 48-49 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249
U.S. 211, 216 (1919).
140
336 U.S. at 498.
141
Id. at 503.
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business relations tort.142 Similarly, a dissenting opinion in Missouri v.
NOW seemingly would have held the same about NOW’s speech urging a
boycott of Missouri, aimed at getting the state legislature to ratify the Equal
Rights Amendment.143 Both of these opinions might be understood as
suggesting that the urged boycotts would have been illegal, and that threats
of such boycotts are therefore unprotected.144
Nonetheless, a rule that threats of boycott are constitutionally
unprotected would probably be unsound today, given NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware. Claiborne also involved a threat of boycott, and a threat of
ostracism (though only social ostracism rather than ejection from a union)
of people who refused to comply with the boycott. Yet the Court held the
speech to be constitutionally protected, even without any inquiry into
whether such boycotts and organized ostracism might have themselves
violated Mississippi law. This suggests that threats of a boycott, or at least
of a politically motivated boycott, are indeed constitutionally protected
speech.145
But even if the true meaning of Giboney is indeed focused on threats,
and survives Claiborne Hardware, then the Giboney principle is far better
captured simply by saying that threats of certain kinds of retaliation—and
especially threats of illegal retaliation—are constitutionally unprotected,
142

646 P.2d 682, 685 (Utah 1982).
620 F.2d 1301, 1324 n.15 (8th Cir. 1980) (Gibson, C.J., dissenting).
144
646 P.2d at 686-89; 620 F.2d at 1321-25.
145
Claiborne distinguished Giboney on the grounds that Giboney involved “regulat[ion
of] economic activity,” rather than “prohibit[ion of] peaceful political activity such as that
found in the boycott in [Claiborne],” 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982), but this strikes me as
unsound. Giboney and Claiborne both involved advocacy that was aimed at improving the
position of a certain social group (union members in Giboney, blacks in Claiborne), and
that worked by threat of economic activity (or inactivity), namely boycott of a certain
business. Of course, the speech in Claiborne was also motivated by the speakers’ beliefs
about morality and justice, and sought to appeal to listeners’ beliefs about morality and
justice; but union speech aimed at benefiting workers is also motivated by concerns about
morality and justice as well as economics. Certainly the labor movement has been an
ideological and political movement and not just an economic one. See Getman & Marshall,
infra note 149, at 719 n.97.
The one possible distinction is that the Giboney picketers were trying only to get
Empire Storage & Ice to change its economic practices; the Claiborne boycotters were
trying to get stores to change their hiring practices but also (perhaps primarily) to get
County officials to change their political decisions (as well as to stop engaging in some
allegedly unconstitutional activity) as well as the County’s hiring practices. 458 U.S. at
899-900. Nonetheless, in an economy dominated by private business, trying to influence
the decisions of the private sector is political activity just as is trying to influence the
decisions of the public sector.
In any event, though, if Giboney is indeed limited to activity aimed at accomplishing
purely economic ends, then it would be inapplicable in all the examples I gave at the start
of this section.
143
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rather than by saying that speech is unprotected when it “carrie[s] out” an
illegal “course of conduct.”146 And most of the applications of Giboney that
I cited in Part III.A would then have to be rejected, because they have
nothing to do with threats.
8. “Conduct” referring to picketing
Finally, Giboney also involved one other form of conduct—picketing
itself, which the Court described as “more than free speech, since it
involves patrol of a particular locality and since the very presence of a
picket line may induce action of one kind or another, quite irrespective of
the nature of the ideas which are being disseminated.”147
Peaceful picketing, it seems to me, should be treated no differently than
any other kind of behavior used to communicate a message: It should be
restrictable to the extent that its noncommunicative elements cause harm,
for instance if it’s too loud or blocks the entrance to a building, but not
restrictable based on its message (again, unless the message falls within an
exception to protection148). And this should be so even if the message on
the picket signs is very simple—essentially, “the labor movement wants you
to boycott this business”—and not backed with a detailed explanation. First
Amendment law protects even simple symbols, from flagburning to black
armbands. The same should be true for the simple message “don’t
patronize places, such as this one, that the union movement condemns.”149
146

See infra note 227 and accompanying text (discussing this issue).
336 U.S. at 503 n.6. See also Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 529-30 (1950)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring in the judgment) (reasoning that picketing should be less
constitutionally protected because “the loyalties and responses evoked and exacted by
picket lines differentiate this form of expression from other modes of communication”).
148
It’s possible that some of the Court’s willingness to restrict even peaceful picketing
stems from the Justices’ sense that labor picketing generally is indeed inherently
threatening to some extent—perhaps because it involves face-to-face confrontations
between picketers who feel their livelihoods are at stake and others whom the picketers
might see as jeopardizing those livelihoods, and because some labor picketing has
historically indeed turned into violence. I don’t think that this potential for violence should
suffice to strip peaceful picketing of protection. But to the extent that this reasoning
suggests that Giboney and similar cases flowed from the Court’s tendency to protect
picketing (or at least labor picketing) less than other speech, it further shows the
impropriety of applying Giboney in other contexts.
149
I thus think that the distinction drawn by Justice Stevens in his concurrence in the
judgment in NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, 447 U.S. 607, 619 (1980)—where he
voted to uphold a secondary picketing ban because it affected “only that aspect of the
union’s efforts to communicate its views that calls for an automatic response to a signal,
rather than a reasoned response to an idea”—is unsound. See Julius G. Getman & F. Ray
Marshall, The Continuing Assault on the Right to Strike, 79 TEX. L. REV. 703, 719 n.97
(2001) (reasoning that “appeal to one’s obligations as a union member or supporter” should
147
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Nonetheless, Giboney was part of a long line of cases that did impose
special restraints on picketing, restraints that would likely be
unconstitutional as to other media.150 The speech in Giboney itself—speech
urging a business to violate state restraint of trade laws and urging people
not to patronize the business until it so acted—would probably be protected
today if it were printed in a newspaper or on leaflets. Such advocacy
doesn’t seem to be both intended to and likely to produce imminent illegal
conduct, the criteria set forth by Brandenburg v. Ohio as necessary for
making speech into punishable incitement of illegal action.151
Likewise, consider a case that shortly followed Giboney, Hughes v.
Superior Court.152 Hughes rejected the First Amendment claims of people
who were peacefully picketing a store to pressure it into hiring black
workers in proportion to the fraction of blacks in the store’s clientele.
There was no powerful union, acting with the benefit of special legal
be just as protected as “more cerebral appeals”); Theodore J. St. Antoine, Justice Frank
Murphy and American Labor Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1900, 1908 (2002) (“if the viewer’s
reaction is a genuinely voluntary, though relatively unthinking, reflex, how can the
picketing that triggers the reaction be distinguished from the cryptic bumper stickers ‘Vote
Free Choice’ or ‘Vote Right to Life’?”).
150
See, e.g., Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769
(1942); Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Vogt,
Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957); NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, 447 U.S. 607, 619
(1980); TRIBE, supra note 39, at 826 (2d ed. 1987) (describing this line of cases). See also
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 578 (1965) (Black, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part) (“Picketing, though it may be utilized to communicate ideas, is not
speech, and therefore is not of itself protected by the First Amendment,” citing Giboney
and Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950)).
151
395 U.S. 444 (1969); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973) (holding that
advocacy of illegal conduct at some unspecified future time doesn’t satisfy the imminence
requirement). In the closely related context of secondary boycotts—union boycotts of a
third party aimed at pressuring it to stop doing business with a struck employer—the
Supreme Court has strongly suggested that leafleting and other speech would be
constitutionally protected, even though picketing is not. Compare Int’l Bhd. of Electrical
Workers v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694, 705 n.10 (1951) (holding picketing in aid of secondary
boycotts to be unprotected, citing Giboney and cases that cited Giboney) with Edward J.
DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction Trades Council, 485 U.S.
568, 575-76, 580, 588 (1988) (holding that the National Labor Relations Act should not be
read as banning leafleting aimed at persuading consumers to engage in a secondary
boycott, because such a reading would pose “serious constitutional questions,” and resting
its decision on the view that “picketing is qualitatively ‘different from other modes of
communication’”).
152
339 U.S. 460, 466 (1950). Hughes relied on Giboney, among other cases, for the
proposition that picketing may be restricted, see id. at 468; and three Justices relied solely
on Giboney, id. at 468 (Black, J., joined by Minton, J., concurring in the judgment); id.
(Reed, J., concurring) (likewise relying solely on Giboney).
See also Int’l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 292 (1957) (characterizing Hughes as an
“elaborat[ion]” of Giboney).
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protections. There was no violence or trespass by the picketers. The
picketers had no power to eject people from a union.
The picketers simply patrolled and expressed sentiments aimed at
getting a store to act in a perfectly lawful way—under California law in
1950, discriminatory hiring was not illegal.153 Newspaper articles urging a
consumer boycott of businesses aimed at getting the businesses to adopt
some legally permissible race-based hiring practice would likely have been
constitutionally protected.
The advocacy, the Court stressed, was
unprotected because it was conveyed through picketing.154
The lesser protection for picketing than for other speech continues to be
the law, at least as to labor picketing.155 So long as it continues to be the
law, Giboney reflects this exception to First Amendment protection. But
even if one endorses this lesser protection for picketing, such an exception
offers no support for applying Giboney to other speech.
C. Supreme Court Applications of Giboney
So it’s hard to figure out just what line Giboney purported to draw—and
the cases where the Court has cited Giboney to support its results only
further suggest that Giboney is unhelpful for First Amendment analysis.
Even when the results of those cases might be right, the “illegal course of
153

Justice Reed took the view that the California Supreme Court opinion held race
discrimination to be unlawful, id. at 468 (Reed, J., concurring), but he was mistaken. The
California Supreme Court majority opinion, 198 P.2d 885 (Cal. 1948), never held this, and
Justice Traynor’s dissenting opinion specifically pointed out that employers remained free
to discriminate based on race. 198 P.2d at 896; see also Jones v. American President
Lines, Ltd., 308 P.2d 393, 395 (Cal. App. 1957) (stating, several years after Hughes, that
“The right to private employment without discrimination on the basis of race is not one
protected by the Constitution, by common law or any statute of the state that we are aware
of; and so plaintiff has not alleged any violation of state or federal laws.”). The California
Supreme Court held only that picketing to pressure employers into discrimination was
unlawful, not that employer discrimination was itself unlawful. See Elliot L. Richardson,
Freedom of Expression and the Function of Courts, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1, 20 n.86 (1951)
(recognizing this); Osmond K. Fraenkel, Peaceful Picketing—Constitutionally Protected?,
99 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 9 (1950) (likewise).
154
See Hughes, 339 U.S. at 464 (stressing that the case involved picketing and not
newspaper articles: “Publication in a newspaper, or by distribution of circulars, may
convey the same information or make the same charge as do those patrolling a picket line.
But the very purpose of a picket line is to exert influences, and it produces consequences,
different from other modes of communication. The loyalties and responses evoked and
exacted by picket lines are unlike those flowing from appeals by printed word.”).
155
Compare NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, 447 U.S. 607 (1980) (upholding
restrictions on secondary picketing) with Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast
Building & Construction Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575-76, 588 (1988) (suggesting
that leafleting aimed at the same end may well be constitutionally protected).
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conduct” principle generally doesn’t help justify those results.
I’ve already alluded to one example—the majority opinion in Cox v.
Louisiana, which tried to use Giboney to explainrestrictions on crime advocating speech and on fighting words:
The examples are many of the application by this Court of the principle
that certain forms of conduct mixed with speech may be regulated or
prohibited. The most classic of these was pointed out long ago by Mr. Justice
Holmes: “The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a
man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.” Schenck v.
United States. A man may be punished for encouraging the commission of a
crime, Fox v. Washington, or for uttering “fighting words,” Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire. This principle has been applied to picketing and parading in labor
disputes. See Hughes v. Superior Court; Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice
Co.; Building Service Employees, etc. v. Gazzam. But cf. Thornhill v.
Alabama. These authorities make it clear, as the Court said in Giboney, that
“it has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or press to
make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part
initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken,
written, or printed.”156

“Encouraging the commission of a crime,” though, was held to be
constitutionally protected (except under narrow circumstances) just four
years later, in Brandenburg v. Ohio.157 The prosecution in Fox, for
publishing a newspaper article praising the practice of nudism, would
clearly be unconstitutional today.158
Likewise, uttering words that may cause a fight would also be
constitutionally protected today unless the words are specifically targeted at
the offended party.159 This distinction in modern fighting words law
between unprotected speech “directed to the person of the hearer”160 (“Fuck
you” said to a particular person) and protected speech said to the world at
large (“Fuck the draft” said on a jacket) may be sound. But the Giboney
principle that speech may be punishable when it carries out an illegal course
of conduct doesn’t really help justify that distinction.
156

379 U.S. 559, 563 (1965) (citations abbreviated); see also Rubenfeld, supra note
13, at 830 (defending bans on fighting words on the grounds that “such speech is properly
regarded as an attempt to commence a fight—a particularized, prohibited course of
conduct”).
157
395 U.S. 444 (1969).
158
Likewise, American Communications Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 399 (1950),
which upheld restrictions on Communists’ serving as union leaders, citing (among other
cases) Giboney, id. at 399-400, is also probably not good law today. See United States v.
Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) (striking down restrictions on Communists working in defense
plants).
159
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 524 (1972); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20
(1971).
160
Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20.
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Similarly, consider Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, where the Court
upheld Ohralik’s punishment for “[i]n-person solicitation by a lawyer of
remunerative employment.”161 The Court cited Giboney in arguing that
such solicitation was constitutionally unprotected, and characterized the
solicitation as “a business transaction in which speech is an essential but
subordinate component.”162 But in Ohralik’s companion case, In re Primus,
the Court made clear that direct solicitation by a lawyer of pro bono
employment in a politically charged case may not be restricted.163
Both transactions were equally “course[s] of conduct,” in which speech
to the client played an equal role. If the Giboney principle stripped one
solicitation of constitutional protection on the ground that the solicitation
carried out an illegal course of conduct, it should have done the same to the
other, and yet the two were treated differently. The Court’s other
justification for its Ohralik decision—that the speech in Ohralik was
commercial speech said face-to-face, and the speech in Primus was
noncommercial speech communicated in a letter164—may be a sound basis
for distinguishing the two cases. Giboney, though, is not.
Similarly, California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited held
that while legitimate litigation is immune from antitrust liability, because
litigation constitutes the exercise of the First Amendment right to petition
the courts, “sham” litigation aimed at “eliminat[ing] an applicant as a
competitor by denying him free and meaningful access to the agencies and
courts” is unprotected.165 The Court relied primarily on Giboney, reasoning
that “First Amendment rights are not immunized from regulation when they
are used as an integral part of conduct which violates a valid statute.”166
But in Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures
Industries, Inc., the Court explicitly limited this “sham litigation” exception
to litigation that is both objectively frivolous and subjectively illmotivated.167 Under the Giboney rationale, objectively reasonable and
unreasonable litigation would equally be “integral part[s] of conduct” aimed
at monopolization; they should thus be treated equally. Yet Professional
Real Estate Investors recognizes that objectively reasonable litigation is a
constitutionally protected exercise of the right to petition, and that’s true
whether or not it is “an integral part of conduct” aimed at securing a
monopoly.
161

436 U.S. 447, 449 (1978).
Id. at 456.
163
436 U.S. 412, 434-35 (1978).
164
Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455-56; Primus, 436 U.S. at 437-38.
165
404 U.S. 508, 514-15 (1972).
166
Id.
167
508 U.S. 49, 60 (1993).
162
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The constitutionally significant distinction is between frivolous
petitioning of the courts, which is unprotected by the Petition Clause against
a wide range of liability, and objectively reasonable petitioning, which is
protected. It is not, as Giboney would suggest, between petitioning that’s an
integral part of a broader pattern of conduct and petitioning that can’t be so
described.
Likewise for New York v. Ferber and Osborne v. Ohio, which upheld
bans on distributing and possessing child pornography, and argued in
passing that
[T]he advertising and selling of child pornography provide an economic
motive for and are thus an integral part of the production of such materials, an
activity illegal throughout the Nation. “It rarely has been suggested that the
constitutional freedom for speech and press extends its immunity to speech or
writing used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal
statute.” Giboney.168

But not all speech that provides a motive for illegal conduct can be
outlawed simply because it is “an integral part of conduct in violation of a
valid criminal statute.” When the New York Times publishes illegally
leaked documents,169 or transcripts of an illegally excerpted conversation, it
would have a strong First Amendment defense (assuming that it got the
documents or tapes from an independent third party), even though the
prospect of such publication may provide a motive for the illegal leak or
illegal interception.170
In some narrow circumstances, there might be some constitutional
justification for restricting the publication of the leaked material—for
instance, if there is some extraordinary pressing national security
concern171—just like there were other First Amendment reasons in Ferber
and Osborne which justified the child pornography exception to the First
Amendment.172 But the broad Giboney “speech . . . used as an integral part
168

New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 762-63 (1982), quoted in Osborne v. Ohio, 495
U.S. 103, 110 (1990).
169
The leak may be illegal because it violates a law that requires government
employees to keep certain information confidential, a law that imposes a duty of loyalty on
corporate employees, or trade secret law. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and
Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts After Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40
HOUS. L. REV. 697, 739-48 (2003) (discussing this).
170
See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001); Landmark Communications, Inc. v.
Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 841-42 (1978).
171
Cf. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 735-40 (1971) (White, J.,
concurring in the judgment, joined by Stewart, J.) (suggesting that publishing illegally
leaked national security secrets might well be criminally punishable); id. at 752-59 (Harlan,
J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., and Blackmun, J.) (concluding that such publication
could even be enjoined).
172
See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982) (stressing how harmful
and how valueless child pornography is); Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 108,110-11
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of conduct” argument can’t itself justify the restriction, or else all
publication of illegally leaked documents would be treated the same way as
publication of illegally created child pornography. 173
D. Rejecting Giboney
Giboney, then, is a poor basis for analyzing speech restrictions. The
case itself provides no clear rule distinguishing speech that’s
constitutionally protected from speech that’s stripped of constitutional
protection. The cases applying Giboney don’t help, either. Some of those
cases use Giboney to reach results that are inconsistent with modern First
Amendment law. Others may reach results that fit the rest of the doctrine,
but in those cases the real foundation for the decision is something other
than the Giboney principle, and the citation of Giboney only obscures the
true rationale.
The Supreme Court decided Giboney in 1949, when the Justices were
still in the early stages of developing free speech doctrine. Many of the
speech-protective Supreme Court decisions of the modern era, such as
Brandenburg v. Ohio, Cohen v. California, and NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware were still decades in the future. It isn’t surprising that some of
the applications of Giboney have proven to be inconsistent with these more
recent cases. If we endorse these more recent decisions, this should lead us
to reject Giboney as a guide to modern free speech law.
IV.

“SITUATION-ALTERING UTTERANCES”

I turn now to a third category of “speech as conduct” arguments, made
famous in the First Amendment literature by Kent Greenawalt’s Speech,
Crime, and the Uses of Language,174 and in the philosophy of language
literature by J.L. Austin and John Searle.175 I will focus on Greenawalt’s
approach; since Austin and Searle were philosophers of language rather
than lawyers, their concern was with discussing how words are used by
people, rather than with drawing legally significant distinctions, and their
arguments are thus of limited help for First Amendment doctrine.176
(1990) (same).
173
See also Frederick Schauer, Codifying the First Amendment: New York v. Ferber,
1982 SUP. CT. REV. 285, 300 (1982) (likewise criticizing Ferber’s use of Giboney).
174
KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE (1989).
175
J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (1962); JOHN R. SEARLE, SPEECH
ACTS (1970).
176
Austin, for instance, casts his book as a criticism of the “assumption of
philosophers that the business of a ‘statement’ can only be to ‘describe’ some state of
affairs, or to ‘state some fact,’ which it must do either truly or falsely.” AUSTIN, supra note
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Speech, Crime, and the Uses of Language contends that some kinds of
statements—for instance, “I promise to help you commit this crime,” “I’ll
raise my prices if you raise yours,” or “I will” said in a wedding
ceremony—are constitutionally unprotected conduct rather than protected
speech.177 And, the argument goes, the statements are conduct rather than
speech for a peculiar reason: They impose, as a matter of social convention,
a felt moral obligation (on the speaker or on listeners).
Utterances are often a means for changing the social context in which we live.
. . . The conventions of language and of ordinary social morality make certain
utterances, such as promises, count as far as one’s moral obligations are
concerned. My essential claim—a central claim for this book—is that
utterances of these sorts are situation-altering and are outside the scope of a
principle of free speech. Such utterances are ways of doing things, not of
asserting things.178

Such “situation-altering utterances” (the book’s term) aren’t limited to
statements that create legal obligations: For instance, even a legally
unenforceable agreement to commit a crime or to set prices, or even a
legally ineffective wedding (for instance, a wedding that all observers know
to be a legally unrecognized same-sex or polygamous wedding), would
qualify. Nor are they limited to statements that create obligations that most
of us would recognize as morally binding; a promise to kill someone may
175, at 1. He then proceeds to disprove that assumption, by pointing out how words can be
used in a “performative” sense as well as the fact-declaring “constative” sense, and in the
process includes within the “performative” category statements that “criticize,” “predict,”
“estimate,” “advise,” “recommend,” “warn,” “urge,” and “plead,” id. at 83, 85-86, 140,
147, 155. This makes clear that the performative/constative line isn’t immediately helpful
to lawyers who are trying to distinguish protected speech from unprotected speech-asconduct, even if it is helpful to philosophers who are trying to understand how people
communicate. Cf. GREENAWALT, supra note 174, at 58 (making the same observation
about Austin’s “performative” utterances, and stressing that “situation-altering utterances”
are a “much narrower [category] than Austin’s category of performatives”).
Austin’s categories of “locutionary act[s]” (“uttering a certain sentence with a certain
sense and reference), “illocutionary acts” (for instance, “informing, ordering, warning,
undertaking, &c, i.e., utterances which have a certain (conventional) force”), and
“perlocutionary acts” (“what we bring about or achieve by saying something, such as
convincing, persuading, deterring, and even, say, surprising or misleading”), are even less
suited to providing constitutionally significant distinctions, and I have no reason to think
that Austin or Austin’s modern heirs would argue otherwise. Even if some kinds of
illocutionary acts, such as undertaking in the sense of promising to do something, might be
constitutionally unprotected, other illocutionary acts—for instance, “informing”—surely
are. Likewise, the perlocutionary acts of “convincing” and “persuading” must certainly be
constitutionally protected. Austin, supra note 175, at 108; see also id. at 102
(distinguishing “the locutionary act ‘he said that . . .’ from the illocutionary act ‘he argued
that . . .’ and the perlocutionary act ‘he convinced me that . . .’”).
177
Id. at 239.
178
Id. at 57-58 (footnotes and paragraph break omitted).
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not be morally binding, but it’s treated as situation-altering. Rather, the
argument goes, they encompass all statements that affect someone’s felt
moral obligations, simply by virtue of the statement’s having been made—
so long as one’s fellow criminals feel that one is morally bound by a
criminal conspiracy, one’s statement agreeing to participate in the
conspiracy is considered situation-altering.
Speech, Crime, and the Uses of Language has been justly lauded, and
while I disagree with it in some measure, I don’t intend to critique it in
detail here. I do, however, want to offer two observations about its
“situation-altering utterance” theory.
A. The Doctrine’s Limited Scope
First, it’s important to recognize the limits that Speech, Crime, and the
Uses of Language itself imposes on this “speech as conduct” category.
“Situation-altering utterances,” as the book defines them, certainly do
not cover all attempts to “do things with words” or to “alter” the “situation”
by speaking. People often use simple assertions of facts or ideas, which the
book excludes from the definition of situation-altering utterances,179 to do
things. When a newspaper publishes an editorial advocating some new
welfare policy, or urging citizens to recycle, it is trying to accomplish a
certain result—a substantive change in people’s conduct. Such clearly
constitutionally protected speech often “alters” the “situation” by its
persuasive or informative force, through the process of “alter[ing] the
listener’s understanding of the world he inhabits.”180 But that doesn’t make
it fit within the definition of “situation-altering.”181
Nor does the definition include all statements that change people’s felt
moral obligations. Telling people that some seemingly benign behavior is
harmful to others, for instance, may impose on them a moral obligation to
avoid such harm. A man who is told that he has a communicable disease
has different moral (and perhaps legal) obligations to others than one who
thinks he’s well. But such statements that reveal preexisting facts are
treated as speech, not as constitutionally unprotected “situation-altering”
conduct, even though they do change people’s moral obligations.182
179

See id. at 57 (distinguishing situation-altering utterances from “claims of fact or
value”).
180
Id. at 59.
181
Id. at 59-60. Under the Speech, Crime, and the Uses of Language framework it
might, at least in some cases, qualify as a “weak imperative,” id. at 68-71, or as “actioninducing,” Kent Greenawalt, Speech and Crime, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 645, 683-85,
but the book makes clear that such speech is still presumptively protected, and doesn’t
count as situation-altering in his scheme, GREENAWALT, supra note 174, at 59-60.
182
GREENAWALT, supra note 174, at 61-62.
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Rather, the “situation-altering utterances” category is limited to
statements that “actually alter the normative world, shifting rights or
obligations” because of their very assertion, and not because of any facts or
ideas that they reveal.183 A promise, for instance, imposes a perceived
moral obligation on the promisor.184 An order by someone in a position of
authority obligates the ordered person to do something.185
These statements affect people not because they communicate some preexisting fact or idea that exists outside the speaker’s control. Rather, such
statements—“exercises of official authority, agreements, promises, orders,
offers, manipulative inducements, and manipulative threats”—affect people
chiefly because the speaker has made them. And, the argument goes, the
statements should therefore be treated as constitutionally unprotected action
rather than constitutionally protected speech.186
This definition means that very little, if any, of the speech I described in
previous sections—speech that some people have argued should be treated
as merely “conduct”187—would constitute “situation-altering utterances.”
Speech that communicates information about how a crime can be
effectively committed would not be situation-altering. Such speech,
whether in a novel, chemistry textbook, or murder manual, would simply be
an “assertion[] of fact,”188 albeit a potentially dangerous one.
Likewise, speech that creates an offensive work, educational, or public
accommodations environment is generally the assertion of offensive ideas
(for instance, that some groups are inferior, or that women should be seen as
sex objects rather than equals in the workplace189) and not an agreement,
183

Id. at 59-60.
Id. at 63-65. I will generally speak in this section of “felt moral obligations” or
“perceived moral obligations,” which is to say moral obligations that some people are
likely to recognize, whether or not the obligation is legally enforceable or morally valid.
This definition reflects the Speech, Crime, and the Uses of Language definition of what
statements are situation-altering, see id. at 59-60, and it’s necessary for the book’s
argument to work: An agreement to commit a crime or to fix prices, for instance, is
“situation-altering” even if it’s legally unenforceable and morally valid—it is “situationaltering” because the parties will perceive it as imposing a moral obligation on them.
185
Id. at 65.
186
Id. at 58. Greenawalt excludes from this list agreements that themselves concern
speech; as to such agreements, “the subject of the agreement makes a free speech principle
relevant,” id. at 64; see also id. at 335-37.
187
See supra text accompanying notes 2-18 and notes 120-129.
188
GREENAWALT, supra note 174, at 58 (distinguishing situation-altering utterances
from assertions of fact).
189
See Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1502-07 (M.D.
Fla. 1991); Barbetta v. Chemlawn Servs. Corp., 669 F. Supp. 569, 573 (W.D.N.Y. 1987);
Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42
VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1212 n.118 (1989); Amy Horton, Comment, Of Supervision,
Centerfolds, and Censorship, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 403, 438 (1991).
184
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promise, order, or the like. Same for speech praising jury nullification,
speech that urges the moral propriety of a boycott, or speech that
recommends marijuana to a patient.
Speech, Crime, and the Uses of Language actually deals with more than
situation-altering utterances; other sections of the book discuss crimefacilitating speech, offensive speech, speech urging illegal or harmful
behavior, and the like.190 But the book correctly treats the latter categories
of speech as assertions of fact and value, and thus as presumptively
constitutionally protected speech, rather than as unprotected situationaltering utterances. And the book then analyzes the costs and benefits of
restricting the speech, and concludes that a good deal of such speech should
indeed be protected, though some can be properly restricted under some
exception to First Amendment protection.
B. The Questionable Relevance of Altering Felt Moral Obligations
As I mentioned, the premise of the “situation-altering utterances”
argument is that when a statement’s utterance imposes—as a matter of
social convention—a felt moral obligation (on the speaker or on listeners),
the statement stops being speech and becomes conduct.191
This is how the book explains the widely shared belief that agreements
and offers aren’t protected as free speech.192 Promises create a felt “moral
obligation,” which “the people who have made [the promise perceive] as
having [moral] force.”193 The promises trigger a “convention[] . . . of
ordinary social morality” that one should keep one’s promises; and the
violation of this convention “renders [the promisors] vulnerable to
counterresponses,”194 which is what makes the promise situation-altering.
Likewise, some other speech (what the book calls “permissions”) waives
felt moral obligations rather than creating them, and it too is thus situationaltering.
But why should a statement’s creating a felt moral obligation turn the
statement from presumptively constitutionally protected speech into
unprotected conduct? There are, after all, lots of social conventions under
which the very making of a statement will be seen by some as increasing
the speaker’s moral obligations, or increasing or decreasing the listener’s
190

See, e.g., GREENAWALT, supra note 174, at 85-87, 110-29, 141-57, 260-80, 287-

313.
191

Id. at 57-58 (footnotes and paragraph break omitted).
See, e.g., Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 55 (1982).
193
Id. at 63; id. at 65 (making clear that the same analysis applies to unilateral
promises as well as to bilateral agreements).
194
Id. at 58, 63.
192
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moral obligations.195 Consider just four examples:
(a) The felt moral impropriety of hypocrisy. There is a perceived moral
duty to avoid hypocrisy—to act consistently with what one says. If
a speaker says that all soldiers fighting in a war are murderers, he is
implicitly undertaking a moral obligation to refuse to fight in the
war. His very statement makes many people expect that he will
practice what he preaches. As with a promise, the “utterance[ has]
alter[ed the speaker’s] normative obligations, what [he] should do in
the future.” “The conventions of language and of ordinary social
morality,” here the moral condemnation of hypocrisy, make this
utterance “count as far as one’s moral obligations are concerned.”196
(b) The felt moral relevance of peers’ and leaders’ moral permissions.
People perceive—rightly or wrongly—that they may do what the
leaders of their community, or their peers, think is permissible.
When either a leader or a large peer group says that “it’s fine to
refuse to deal with people of other ethnic groups,” many people
might feel less of an obligation to act in a nondiscriminatory way.197
(c) The felt moral relevance of peers’ and leaders’ moral demands.
People also sometimes feel that they should do what leaders or peers
think is necessary. For instance, when the leader or the peers say
“one should refuse to deal with people of other ethnic groups,”
many people might feel something of an obligation to engage in
such an ethnic boycott. In both this example and the last one, the
leader’s or peers’ “utterance[ has] alter[ed the listener’s] normative
obligations, what [he] should do in the future”—in the earlier
example, by weakening the listener’s normative obligation not to
discriminate, and in this example by imposing a new obligation to
discriminate. (The obligation may be morally controversial, not
195

Under the Speech, Crime, and the Uses of Language framework, either of these
three kinds of change to moral obligations would make a statement situation-altering. See
id. at 63-65 (promises are situation-altering because they increase the speaker’s felt moral
obligations); id. at 65 (permissions are situation-altering because they decrease the
listener’s felt moral obligations, by allowing the listener to do something that he might
have otherwise seen as immoral); id. at 65 (orders are situation-altering because they
increase the listener’s felt moral obligations). The missing fourth category is statements
that decrease a speaker’s moral obligations, but I take it that it’s rare that people can
decrease their own felt moral obligations just by speaking, and if they can do so, then
perhaps the obligations weren’t that obligatory in the first place.
196
Id. at 57-58. Perhaps it might not count as much as a statement that “I promise not
to drink alcohol,” or especially “we mutually promise to each other not to drink alcohol,”
but it does count.
197
“Situation-altering utterances” include statements that diminish a listener’s moral
obligations—for instance, a permission such as “Go ahead and hit me, I wish you’d try it.”
Id. at 65.
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very strong, and not equally felt by everyone; but the same is true of
many promises, especially promises to do illegal things.)
(d) The felt professional obligation to respond. In scholarship, and
likely in other fields, there is a social convention that people ought
to respond to their serious critics. A scientist who fails to respond to
his critics may be condemned by his peers, just as a scientist who
fails to keep his promises may be condemned by his peers. And this
is so regardless of whether the critics persuade the peers: The
critics’ very making of the statements creates something of an
obligation to respond.198
So all these cases satisfy the criteria for situation-altering utterances:
The statements change the speaker’s, the listener’s, or the criticized
person’s felt moral obligations. The statements change the obligations
simply by the statements’ having been made. Naturally, if the statements
are especially persuasive, they also create an obligation through their
persuasiveness. But they create such an obligation even independently of
their persuasiveness: Even if most of the anti-war speaker’s audience isn’t
persuaded that the war is evil, the speaker will still have incurred a felt
moral obligation to act consistently with what he had said.
Yet it’s not clear that any of these statements “are ways of doing things,
not of asserting things”; and even if they are both ways of doing things and
of asserting things, it’s not clear that what they do should be any less
constitutionally protected than what they assert. Yes, they create or waive
felt moral obligations. But they do so by communicating, just as pure
statements of fact or value sometimes create or waive felt moral obligations.
I suspect that most people’s first reaction to the statements described above
is that they’re pure speech; and the “situation-altering utterance” theory
doesn’t explain why we should take a different view.
I share the intuition that agreements and offers should be
constitutionally unprotected. But it seems to me that the “situation-altering
utterances” framework—which theorizes that agreements and offers alter
felt moral obligations, and that speech that alters felt moral obligations is
unprotected—is not entirely persuasive.
It’s possible, even accepting the situation-altering utterance theory, to
explain why the examples I give should remain constitutionally protected
198

See id. at 144 (suggesting that some fighting words might be situation-altering
because they create a felt moral obligation on the target to respond; a professional
challenge may have even more obligatory force). Of course, the felt moral obligation in
one situation might be to fight, and in the other to speak. But under the “situation-altering
utterance” theory, both seem to be situation-altering utterances, because both do something
(create a moral obligation, even if it’s just a moral obligation to say something) rather than
merely communicating assertions of fact or value.
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despite their situation-altering component: Banning such statements would
also make it hard to convey the facts and opinions that they convey;
banning overt promises or offers, on the other hand, would probably still
leave people free to convey the same facts and opinions, just by changing
their statements in some measure. Speech, Crime, and the Uses of
Language in fact sometimes suggests this sort of distinction,199 though it
sometimes seems to take a different approach.200
This approach may even fit the way the First Amendment generally
deals with behavior that consists both of conduct and of speech. Say that
expression of fact or opinion is done using physical conduct that’s harmful
199

See id. at 60 (acknowledging that agreements to marry convey certain facts and
opinions, but reasoning that “if we focus on opportunities for communication, whatever
one wants to communicate about facts and values can typically be asserted much more
straightforwardly by means other than a situation-altering utterance”); id. at 60-61
(acknowledging that offers to bet convey “intensity of belief,” but reasoning that “Since a
prohibition on betting would exert only a slight effect on people’s ability to express the
certainty of their opinions, the betting example does not yield a very strong argument for
treating situation-altering utterances like statements of fact, and we can rest with the
generalization that a free speech principle does not reach situation-altering utterances”).
200
At times the book inquiries whether the situation-altering aspect of an utterance
“dominates” the assertions of fact or opinion. See, e.g., id. at 57 (saying, in the first
paragraph of the “Situation-Altering Utterances” section, that “I here examine some major
uses [of language] which are common subjects of criminal statutes and which do not
dominantly involve claims of fact or value”); id. at 60 (“Because the ‘performative’ aspect
of most such utterances [such as agreements to marry] so entirely dominates any implicit
claims of fact and value and because similar implicit claims are present in virtually all
noncommunicative behavior, we need not alter our conclusion that a principle of free
speech does not apply to situation-altering utterances as it applies to claims of fact and
value.”). This, though, strikes me as a mistaken approach. As John Hart Ely famously put
it, much expressive conduct is “100% action and 100% expression.” Ely, supra note 93, at
1495. Neither aspect is “dominant” in principle, and even if it could be, courts couldn’t
practically decide which component dominates the other. Id. Likewise as to supposedly
situation-altering utterances: A speech by a respected community leader praising a racebased boycott is both a means of trying to persuade people, and a means of making them
feel a moral obligation (or at least giving them a moral permission) to act as the respected
leader suggests. The same goes for peer pressure from fellow community members. It’s
not clear whether either factor can predominate in theory, and in any event it’s hard to see
how one can decide which factor predominates in practice.
And the same is also true for the matters that the “situation-altering utterance” theory
is trying to explain, such as agreements and offers. A person’s going through a marriage
ceremony—again, let’s assume that it’s not a legally binding ceremony—creates moral
obligations, conveys facts about the person’s mental state, and often conveys the person’s
moral beliefs (especially when the ceremony is controversial, for instance because it is a
same-sex ceremony). An offer to join a political conspiracy may likewise be at least as
much a political statement as a statement that changes people’s felt moral obligations. Yet
the law would treat such offers and agreements as punishable offers and agreements,
without any inquiry into which element “predominates.” And Professor Greenawalt would
presumably reach the same result.
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for reasons unrelated to the facts or opinions it conveys—for instance, when
someone uses loud amplification to express his message. The government
may then generally restrict this mixture of expression and physical conduct
if the restriction (1) focuses on the conduct element, (2) is narrowly tailored
to an important government interest in restricting the conduct, and (3)
leaves open ample alternative channels for expressing the message.201 The
same rule should apply, the argument would go, to expressions of fact or
opinion (pure speech) that are also situation-altering utterances (speech that
ought to be treated as conduct).
But such a defense, I think, would miss the point: In the examples
given above, all aspects of the speech—both its informational and
persuasive value, and any felt change in moral obligation that the speech
might yield—should be constitutionally protected.
True, the speech may change people’s felt moral obligations by creating
peer pressure, by taking advantage of professional norms, or by committing
the speaker to act in a certain way lest he face charges of hypocrisy. But
even if the government’s aim in restricting the speech is only to prevent
such changed moral obligations, the restriction should be unconstitutional,
period (unless the speech falls within one of the exceptions to protection).
There should be no need for any complicated and likely subjective inquiry
into whether the prohibition would still leave the speaker relatively free to
convey the bare factual or ideological assertions without the supposedly
“situation-altering” factors.
C. The Problem of Agreements and Offers
Professor Greenawalt has certainly identified an important unresolved
problem: Judges, scholars, and others generally believe (and likely correctly believe) that certain statements—“exercises of official authority,
agreements, promises, orders, offers, manipulative inducements, and
manipulative threats”202—are constitutionally unprotected; but neither the
Supreme Court nor the legal academy has fully explained why this is so.203
I suspect that the problem isn’t that complex or novel for exercises of
official authority, official orders, orders within a business, or orders within
a criminal gang. These are threats: Do this or you’ll be fired, jailed, or
perhaps even killed.204 Speech, Crime, and the Uses of Language itself
201

See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
See GREENAWALT, supra note 174, at 58.
203
See, e.g., Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 55-56 (1982) (reasoning that many
though not all promises are constitutionally unprotected, but not explaining why this is so,
or where the line should be drawn).
204
See id. at 65-66.
202
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acknowledges that direct threats should be analyzed as speech rather than as
situation-altering utterance, and concludes (for good reason) that they
should be unprotected speech.205 Likewise, the lack of protection given to
manipulative threats can also be justified under the general threats
exception, though I agree that this exception should be limited to exclude
“warning threats.”206
For agreements, offers, and manipulative inducements (which are
essentially a form of offer), the problem is considerably harder.207 I can’t
claim to have a solution to the problem, and this may be reason to consider
my criticisms of the “situation-uttering utterances” framework with some
skepticism: That framework, at least, proposes a solution, and I do not. Yet
it seems to me that the expression of moral commitment does not itself
suffice to make speech into nonspeech conduct.
Here, as elsewhere, it may be better to recognize that speech which
conveys an offer or a promise—and certainly the broader range of speech
that changes people’s felt moral obligations—is indeed speech, not merely
conduct. Such speech sometimes does communicate facts and ideas. It
sometimes should be protected, for instance in the examples I mention
above. But it should also be sometimes restrictable for certain reasons,
related to the harm that it can cause, and its likely lack of First Amendment
value. This is the very sort of analysis that Speech, Crime, and the Uses of
Language itself applies to other kinds of speech, such as false statements of
fact, unconditional threats, and solicitation of crime208—speech that should
be restrictable even though it isn’t situation-altering.
But even if I’m mistaken, and even if agreements, offers, orders, and
manipulative threats should be seen as conduct rather than speech, it’s
important to recognize that this “situation-altering utterance” category is
quite narrow. Statements of fact and value remain speech, not conduct.
Crime-facilitating speech, offensive speech, and copycat-inspiring speech
all remain speech, even if one accepts the “situation-altering utterances”
framework.

205

Id. at 90-91, 290-92.
See, e.g., id. at 91; see also John Sauer, Conditional Threats and the First
Amendment (in draft); State v. Robertson, 649 P.2d 569, 578 (Ore. 1982); Wurtz v. Risley,
719 F.2d 1438, 1443 (9th Cir. 1983).
207
Agreements literally involve nothing but speech: After all, a conspiracy is formed
not by the agreement inside each conspirator’s heads, which coconspirators and jurors
usually won’t learn about, but by the expression of that agreement to the coconspirators.
Sometimes that expression could be wordless—as with a nod—or even entirely tacit. But
if there is a conspiracy, it must be that one conspirator’s action has intentionally expressed
to another conspirator his agreement to work together.
208
See GREENAWALT, supra note 174, at 110-18, 130-40, 260-80, 290-92, 314-27.
206
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THE UNCHARTED ZONES OF FREE SPEECH

I’ve argued above that when speech is restricted because of harms
caused by its content, we ought not try to evade the First Amendment
problem by simply renaming the speech “conduct.” As Bill Van Alstyne
has written, pointing to two examples:
Lying on the witness stand is not less speech than lying about the weather
. . ., although it may also be perjury. The shout of “Fire!” is not less speech in
the Holmes instance than the shout of “Fire!” from the mouth of an actor on
the stage of the same theater, spoken as but a word in a play. It is futile to
argue that an appropriately tailored law that punishes any or all of these
utterances does not abridge speech. It does, it is meant to, and one should not
take recourse to verbal subterfuge, e.g., that it is “speech-brigaded-withaction” or “conduct” alone that is curtailed . . . .209

But what, then, of the classic examples of speech that people say ought
to be restricted under this rubric? Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association
followed its citation of Giboney by citing “exchange of securities
information; corporate proxy statements; exchange of information among
competitors; and employers’ threats of retaliation for employees’ labor
activities” as evidence that “the State does not lose its power to regulate
commercial activity deemed harmful to the public whenever speech is a
component of that activity.”210 The Justice Department likewise followed
its Giboney argument by citing “inchoate crimes” such as “conspiracy,
facilitation, solicitation, bribery, coercion, blackmail, and aiding and
abetting”211 as examples of speech that can be prohibited as conduct.212
Rice v. Paladin Press argued that “Were the First Amendment to bar or
to limit government regulation of such ‘speech brigaded with action,’ the
government would be powerless to protect the public from . . . extortion or
blackmail[;] . . . threats and other improper influences in official and
political matters[;] . . . perjury and various cognate crimes[;] . . . criminal
solicitation[;] . . . conspiracy[;] . . . [criminal] harassment[;] . . . forgery[;] . .
. successfully soliciting another to commit suicide . . .; and the like.”213
Some judicial opinions have likewise pointed to speech by professionals

209

William Van Alstyne, A Graphic Review of the Free Speech Clause, 70 CAL. L.
REV. 107, 114 (1982). Van Alstyne is of course not condemning these speech
restrictions—he is only condemning the attempt to deny that these are indeed speech
restrictions.
210
436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
211
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 17, at text accompanying n.57.
212
For a broader analysis of why these examples have long gone undiscussed, see
Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765
(2004).
213
128 F.2d 233, 244 (4th Cir. 1997).
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said to their clients.214
The answer, it seems to me, is the one that First Amendment law
generally gives: There are exceptions to the First Amendment’s protection,
and the courts ought to identify the boundaries of those exceptions.215 For
instance, the Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio didn’t deal with advocacy of
illegal conduct simply by describing it as the “inchoate crime[]” of illegal
advocacy, or by citing Giboney.216 Rather, the Court acknowledged that
such advocacy is presumptively protected speech, and carefully defined the
narrow circumstances under which such advocacy can be punished.217
Similarly, fraud, perjury, and forgery can be punished under the false
statements of fact exception.218 “[E]mployers’ threats of retaliation for
employees’ labor activities”219 and other threats could be punished under
the threats exception. These exceptions aren’t just special cases of a
“conduct unprotected, speech protected” principle. They are separately
crafted rules that let the government punish speech in particular
circumstances, based on arguments about the harm and value of speech that
are specific to each exception.
214

See, e.g., SEC v. Lowe, 472 U.S. 181, 228 (1985) (White, J., concurring in the
judgment) (“The power of government to regulate the professions is not lost whenever the
practice of a profession entails speech,” citing Giboney); Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement
of Psychoanalysis v. California Bd. of Psychiatry, 228 F.3d 1043, 1053-55 (9th Cir. 2000)
(likewise).
215
See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 245-46 (2002) (“As a
general principle, the First Amendment bars the government from dictating what we see or
read or speak or hear. The freedom of speech has its limits; it does not embrace certain
categories of speech, including defamation, incitement, obscenity, and pornography
produced with real children.”).
216
Cf. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 563 (1965) (suggesting in passing that
“encouraging the commission of a crime” is indeed punishable, and citing the Giboney
language as supporting that position).
217
I think solicitation of crime should be dealt with by modifying incitement doctrine.
Solicitation, like incitement, is a form of crime advocacy; but it is generally aimed at one
person and is unlikely to persuade or inform that person of any political ideas, and this
might justify relaxing the imminence standard. Cf. Cherry v. State, 306 A.2d 634, 639-41
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1973). But see People v. Salazar, 362 N.W.2d 913 (Mich. App.
1985), which overturned a solicitation conviction on the grounds that the defendant was
trying to solicit someone to commit a crime some time in the future, rather than
imminently, citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). See generally Volokh,
Crime-Facilitating Speech, supra note 3, at pts. II.C, IV.A.2.a, V.C (discussing why speech
that is aimed solely at an audience that one knows to consist of criminals, and that is likely
to help bring about crime, should be unprotected).
218
See, e.g., Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc., 123 S. Ct.
1829, 1841 (2003) (applying the false statements of fact exception to knowingly false
statements even outside defamation law).
219
See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969); Allentown Mack Sales &
Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 386 (1998).
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The same goes for some of the examples that I cite in the Introduction.
I suggest elsewhere,220 for instance, the proper boundaries of a “crimefacilitating speech” exception under which some speech that might qualify
as “facilitation” or “aiding and abetting” may be punished.221
These boundaries shouldn’t be those of the crime of criminal facilitation
(generally defined as recklessly or knowingly, and sometimes even
negligently, helping a criminal)222 or of aiding and abetting (generally
defined as intentionally, or sometimes knowingly, helping a criminal).223
Not all such speech should be restrictable, even if may fit within the
definitions of those crimes: A chemistry textbook that describes how
explosives are made, for instance, should be constitutionally protected even
if it recklessly facilitates the construction of bombs by criminals. Rather,
the boundaries ought to be developed by considering the usual First
Amendment factors—the value of the speech, 224 the harm that it causes, the
difficulty of drawing certain lines, the risk that punishing some speech will
deter other speech, and so on—and not just asking whether the speech
constitutes “criminal conduct.”225
220

Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, supra note 3.
This may also justify restrictions on insiders’ leaks of information about securities.
Such leaks are actually an example of crime-facilitating speech said to a small audience
that the speaker knows is likely to use the speech for criminal purposes: Trading based on
inside information is illegal, and the tip provides information that lets people engage in
such conduct. See Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, supra note 3, at pt. V.B (explaining
why such speech may be restricted).
222
See supra note 4.
223
See supra note 25.
224
This of course implicates the perennial debates about what theory of First
Amendment value courts should use. See Adam M. Samaha, Litigant Sensitivity in First
Amendment Law 12 n.49 (draft) (citing the leading articles advocating for the various
views). The Supreme Court has been notoriously reluctant to resolve those debates, and to
settle on any theory—self-government, search for truth, self-expression, and so on—as
being the sole foundation of First Amendment law. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Philip P.
Frickey, Practical Reason and the First Amendment, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1615, 1617-19
(1987); Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a
General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1212, 1217-23 (1983).
I need not, however, take sides on this subject. My argument here is simply that,
whatever one thinks is the proper metric of First Amendment value, the decisions about
what speech should be protected must turn on the factors I mention in the text (which
include the value of the speech). They should not turn on the characterization of speech as
“conduct,” at least when the speech is being restricted precisely because of what it
communicates, and the harms that may supposedly flow from that communication.
225
See Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, supra note 3 (going through this analysis).
One can of course argue that a good deal of such speech—or other speech, such as
solicitation, agreements, and the like—should be unprotected on the grounds that it isn’t
part of “public discourse,” a concept most prominently explored by Robert Post. See
Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion,
221
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The same is true, I think, for blackmail and coercion. Some speech that
might be called blackmail and coercion should surely be unprotected. Other
speech—for instance, “stop shopping at these white-owned stores, or we’ll
publicize your noncompliance with our boycott” or “stop engaging in
certain real estate selling practices, or we’ll distribute leaflets to your
neighbors criticizing you”226—is constitutionally protected. The lines
between the protected and unprotected must be drawn, and scholars and
courts have suggested such lines (which would presumably become part of
the threats exception).227 But the lines can’t be drawn based simply on
assertions that some speech is speech and other speech is conduct.
Some of the other categories haven’t gotten the attention that they
deserve. Conspiracy and bribery, for instance, involve agreements and
offers of agreement. Not everything that is called conspiracy or bribery
should be unprotected: A conspiracy to teach Communist doctrine or the
propriety of polygamy228 or a conspiracy to obstruct the draft by persuading
people that the draft is wrong229 should be protected.230 So should a bribe in
Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601
(1990); Robert C. Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249,
1276 (1995); see also WEINSTEIN, supra note 107, at 44-48. This inquiry is closely related,
I think, to the inquiries I mention in the text, especially the value of the speech. But as I
argue in Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, supra note 3, at pt. II.B, much speech that
helps people commit crime is indeed a potentially valuable contribution to public
discourse. The label “aiding and abetting” is not an adequate way of drawing the line
between public discourse and other speech, or between valuable speech and valueless
speech.
226
See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886 (1982); Organization for a Better
Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971). See also Keefe, 402 U.S. at 419 (“The claim that the
expressions were intended to exercise a coercive impact on respondent does not remove
them from the reach of the First Amendment. Petitioners plainly intended to influence
respondent’s conduct by their activities; this is not fundamentally different from the
function of a newspaper.”).
227
See, e.g., GREENAWALT, supra note 174, at 91; Sauer, supra note 206; State v.
Robertson, 649 P.2d 569, 578 (Ore. 1982); Wurtz v. Risley, 719 F.2d 1438, 1443 (9th Cir.
1983).
228
See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (upholding conviction for
conspiracy to teach Communist doctrine); State v. Musser, 175 P.2d 724, 731 (Utah 1946)
(upholding conviction for conspiracy to teach the propriety of polygamy), vacated and
remanded, 333 U.S. 95 (1948); TRIBE, supra note 39, at 846 (“Dennis is generally deemed
to mark the temporary eclipse of the Holmes-Brandeis formulation of the clear and present
danger test.”); John T. Wirenius, The Road to Brandenburg: A Look at the Evolving
Understanding of the First Amendment, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 1, 48 (1994) (concluding that
“The basic holding of Dennis was overruled” in Brandenburg v. Ohio); Vitiello, supra note
30, at 1219 (“were Dennis or the World War I Era cases to arise today, the results would
almost certainly be different”).
229
See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (noting that Schenck was
prosecuted for, among other things, conspiracy to obstruct the draft).
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the form of “If you vote for this law, our advocacy group will give you its
valuable endorsement during the next election season,”231 or a candidate’s
promise to refund to the county and thus to the voters some of his salary.232
As I suggest in Part IV.C, courts and commentators ought to explain how
one can distinguish constitutionally unprotected promises from
constitutionally protected ones—just as the law distinguishes
constitutionally unprotected personal insults, false statements of fact, or
statements advocating illegal conduct from constitutionally protected
ones.233
The same goes for certain speech that might violate antitrust law or
securities law.234 For instance, as Justice Holmes recognized, it’s not
obvious when the publication of price and production information should be
constitutionally unprotected235 (as opposed to just being admissible as
evidence to prove that price-setting was actually price-fixing236). But
wherever the lines should be drawn, these decisions can’t just be made by
saying that such speech constitutes the conduct of attempted
monopolization, just as lobbying for anticompetitive legislation can’t be
outlawed on the grounds that it constitutes attempted monopolization.237
230

See GREENAWALT, supra note 174, at 64, 335-37.
See Daniel H. Lowenstein, Political Bribery and the Intermediate Theory of
Politics, 32 UCLA L. REV. 784, 809-11 (1985) (discussing this issue).
232
Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 57-58 (1982).
233
See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15
(1971); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
234
See Burt Neuborne, The First Amendment and Government Regulation of Capital
Markets, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 5, 40-63 (1989) (outlining some principles for analyzing
securities laws under the First Amendment); Long Island Lighting Co. v. Barbash, 779
F.2d 793, 798-99 (2d Cir. 1985) (Winter, J., dissenting) (suggesting that proxy solicitation
rules can’t constitutionally be applied to certain kinds of speech).
235
See American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 413 (1921)
(Holmes, J., dissenting). Cf. also National Society of Professional Engineers v. United
States, 435 U.S. 679, 697-99 (1978), which upheld a Sherman Act injunction barring a
professional society “from adopting any official opinion, policy statement, or guideline
stating or implying that competitive bidding is unethical.” The Court justified the
injunction on the ground that the Society had already been found guilty of illegally entering
into agreements prohibiting competitive bidding, id. at 684 & n.5, and that courts have the
power “to fashion appropriate restraints” to prevent and to remedy such illegal behavior. It
seems to me that without some such illegal past agreement, an organization’s claims about
business ethics—for instance, claims that it’s unethical for professionals or businesses to
deal with oppressive governments or to employ cheap foreign labor—would be
constitutionally protected even if some law purported to condemn them as attempted
“restraint of trade.”
236
See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 488-89 (1993) (holding that speech may be
used of evidence of criminal intent or of physical behavior); Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S.
631, 642 (1947) (same).
237
See Eastern Railroad Conference v. Noerr Motors, 365 U.S. 127 (1961); United
231
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Treason poses a similar sort of problem. Some speech may well be
treasonous, even if we set aside speech that reveals state secrets238 or tells
the enemy the sailing dates of troopships.239 Axis Sally, for instance, was
rightly punished for broadcasting, while working for the Nazis, a radio
program aimed at decreasing the morale of American soldiers.240
But at the same time, much speech that does help the enemy must
remain constitutionally protected. During war as during peace, Americans
have a right and responsibility to evaluate their government’s actions, and
decide whether the actions—or the administration—need changing. To
make these decisions we need to hear various views on whether the war is
going well, whether we’re morally in the right in our actions, and so on.
An American during the Vietnam War, for instance, should have had the
right to argue to his fellow citizens that the war was unwinnable, that the
U.S. should pull out, and that voters should support an antiwar candidate.241
His arguments and others like his might well have helped the enemy, if they
weakened U.S. resolve, made it more likely that the U.S. would indeed
withdraw, or emboldened the Viet Cong. Moreover, if he thought the Viet
Cong was in the right, he might well have wanted and intended the enemy
to win.
Still, his speech should probably have been protected, even despite his
intent to help our enemies. The speech might well have contributed
valuable arguments to an important public debate, regardless of his
intentions. And even if his intentions made him morally culpable and thus
theoretically deserving of punishment, in practice prohibiting all speech that
intentionally helps the enemy risks punishing even speakers who intend
only to protect American interests, but whose intentions are mistaken by
prosecutors and juries.242
Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). For an example of an article that takes
this First Amendment issue seriously, see Stephen G. Thompson, Antitrust, the First
Amendment, and the Communication of Price Information, 56 TEMPLE L.Q. 939 (1983).
238
See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389 (1992) (suggesting that such may
be treason). As to speech that reveals secrets that the speaker has promised not to reveal,
see United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 606 (1995) (upholding criminal punishment for
releasing confidential information, on the grounds that “As to one who voluntarily assumed
a duty of confidentiality, governmental restrictions on disclosure are not subject to the
same stringent standards that would apply to efforts to impose restrictions on unwilling
members of the public.”); Cohen v. Cowles Media, 501 U.S. 663 (1991) (holding that the
First Amendment doesn’t give people a right to breach nondisclosure agreements); Snepp
v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980) (likewise).
239
See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716(1931) .
240
See, e.g., Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
241
See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text; Tom Bell, Treasonous Speech,
Technology, and the First Amendment (in draft).
242
See Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, supra note 3, at pt. IV.B.2 (pointing out the
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Perhaps the proper test is whether the speaker was getting paid by the
enemy243 or otherwise coordinated his actions with the enemy.244 Perhaps
it’s whether the speech was aimed at American voters generally or whether
it was aimed at soldiers specifically. Perhaps it’s something else altogether;
or perhaps I’m mistaken, and a sound First Amendment analysis would
conclude that the pro-Viet Cong speech I describe should indeed have been
unprotected.
But again the problem should be solved by recognizing that treason law
as applied to such speech is indeed a speech restriction, and inquiring
whether the success of the war effort and the protection of our soldiers
justifies restricting the speech. It’s a mistake to try to avoid the First
Amendment problem by categorically concluding that speech which helps
the enemy is conduct rather than speech, or that treasonous speech is
unproblematically punishable because the treason statute is a law of general
applicability.
Finally, courts need to develop First Amendment standards for
regulations of professionals’ speech to clients;245 and here too Giboney and
the speech/conduct distinction is an inadequate tool for helping develop
such standards. Most of what many lawyers, investment advisors,
accountants, psychotherapists, and even doctors do is speech. Even if we
conclude that speech in special government-created fora, such as
courtrooms, should be treated differently from other speech, many lawyerclient relationships consist simply of lawyers’ advising their clients.246
Such speech, I think, should be subject to greater regulation than speech
to the public at large. For instance, licensing requirements for professionals
who give personalized advice should probably be constitutionally
permissible;247 rules that one needs a license to write self-help books should
shortcomings of intent standards in free speech law).
243
This might indeed be a sort of conduct/speech distinction, but one that is focused on
what is truly a conduct element (receipt of money) rather than the content of what the
speech communicates.
244
See United States v. Chandler, 171 F.2d 921, 939 (1st Cir. 1948) (focusing on both
these elements).
245
For a fine analysis of this issue, see Robert Kry, The “Watchman for Truth”:
Professional Licensing and the First Amendment, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 885 (2000).
246
See id. at 893 (“When a professional does no more than render advice to a client,
the government’s interest in protecting the public from fraudulent or incompetent practice
is quite obviously directed at the expressive component of the professional’s practice rather
than the nonexpressive component (if such a component even exists).”). See also Daniel
Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitutional Status of
Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771 (1999) (generally discussing professional
speech); Paula Berg, Toward a First Amendment Theory of Doctor-Patient Discourse and
the Right to Receive Unbiased Medical Advice, 74 B.U. L. REV. 201 (1994) (likewise).
247
See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. California Bd. of
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not be. Likewise, seemingly unsound advice by a lawyer—including advice
that’s based on what the profession may view as unreasonable predictions,
even when no false statements of fact are involved—should be regulable.
Equally bad recommendations in books and radio programs ought not be.248
Similarly, laws that constrain the sexual choices of authors of advice
books, or of movie stars who project an image of trustworthiness, would
violate both the First Amendment249 and the Lawrence v. Texas sexual
autonomy right.250 Rules restricting psychotherapists from having sex with
their clients, on the other hand, are likely constitutional.251 When a
professional “takes the affairs of a client personally in hand and purports to
exercise judgment on behalf of the client in the light of the client’s
individual needs and circumstances,”252 the government may properly try to
shield the client from the professional’s incompetence or abuse of trust.
At the same time, it’s far from clear that the government should be
completely free to regulate speech by professionals to their clients. For
instance, I doubt that the government may simply ban doctors from
informing patients that marijuana is the best solution to their problems.253
Perhaps doctors could be prevented from writing recommendations that, by
operation of state law, free patients from state liability for marijuana
possession, though even that’s not clear.254 But I’m fairly certain that
Psychiatry, 228 F.3d 1043, 1053-55 (9th Cir. 2000) (upholding licensing requirement for
psychoanalysts). But see Kry, supra note 246, at 967-73 (arguing the contrary).
248
See, e.g., Smith v. Linn, 563 A.2d 123, 125-26 (Pa. Super. 1989).
249
A restriction on the behavior of people who speak on certain subject matters should
be at least as unconstitutional as a tax on people who speak on certain subject matters. See
Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 228-30 (1987).
250
123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
251
See Caddy v. State, 764 So.2d 625, 629-30 (Fla. App. 2000) (holding that such
restrictions don’t violate the Florida Constitution’s sexual autonomy guarantee as to current
patients, and as to former patients when applied “on a case by case basis with consideration
given to the nature, extent, and context of the professional relationship between the
physician and the person,” though holding unconstitutional a flat ban on all sexual
relationships with ex-patients).
252
SEC v. Lowe, 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985) (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
253
See Robert D. Goldstein, Reading Casey: Structuring the Woman’s Decisionmaking
Process, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 787, 852, 863-64, 866-67 (1996) (arguing that
physician-patient speech should generally be constitutionally protected, at least when it
conveys valuable knowledge to the patient).
254
See Kry, supra note 246, at 894-95. Compare Conant v. McCaffrey, 172 F.R.D.
681, 698 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (citing Giboney in the course of concluding that “If physicians’
conduct, which could include speech, rises to the level of aiding and abetting or conspiracy,
in violation of valid federal statutes, such conduct is punishable under federal law,” without
explaining when recommending marijuana constitutes aiding and abetting or conspiracy
and when it doesn’t), Pearson v. McCaffrey, 139 F. Supp. 2d 113, 121 (D.D.C. 2001)
(likewise), and Petition for Certiorari, Walters v. Conant, No. 03-40, at 20 (filed June 7,
2003, by the Solicitor General) (likewise) with Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 637-38
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doctors at least have the constitutional right to inform their patients of the
medical benefits of marijuana, and to urge the patients to lobby their
legislators to enact a medical marijuana exception.
Likewise, I doubt that it would be constitutional for the government to
prohibit psychotherapists or family counselors from telling their patients
that divorce may be the best solution, or to ban the counselors from
advocating (or condemning) interracial marriages or adoptions. The
Planned Parenthood v. Casey Court may have been right to reject the
doctors’ First Amendment objection to the informed consent requirement.
But the plurality opinion’s dismissal of the objection was likely too quick:
All that is left of petitioners’ argument is an asserted First Amendment
right of a physician not to provide information about the risks of abortion, and
childbirth, in a manner mandated by the State. To be sure, the physician’s
First Amendment rights not to speak are implicated, see Wooley v. Maynard,
430 U.S. 705 (1977), but only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to
reasonable licensing and regulation by the State, cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S.
589, 603 (1977). We see no constitutional infirmity in the requirement that
the physician provide the information mandated by the State here.255

Maybe there should generally be no restrictions on government-compelled
speech in the professional-client relationship, perhaps because such speech
compulsions don’t keep the client from being informed. But if the
government prohibited doctors from informing their patients about all the
possible abortion procedures (including legal ones), or even about
procedures that are not themselves constitutionally protected, such a
prohibition may well be unconstitutional.256
Courts, then, need to answer some First Amendment questions here.
First, in which kinds of relationship should speech be more regulable? For
instance, what about professor-student relationships, career advisor-advisee
relationships, or fortuneteller-client relationships?257 Second, should the
(9th Cir. 2002) (holding such speech constitutionally protected) and id. at 643-44
(Kozinski, J., concurring) (stressing that a prohibition on such speech violated the patients’
rights as listeners as well as the doctors’ rights as speakers).
255
505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) (plurality).
256
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991), upheld a restriction on government-funded
doctors informing patients about abortions; but the Court’s decision rested entirely on the
restriction’s being a condition attached to funding—nothing in the case suggests that the
result would be the same if the ban applied to all doctors, including privately funded ones.
257
Several courts have struck down bans on fortunetelling on First Amendment
grounds, concluding that such bans are content-based restrictions on the fortuneteller’s
constitutionally protected opinions and predictions; none considered whether the
fortuneteller-client relationship should be subject to lower scrutiny because the
fortuneteller is a professional advisor. See Argello v. City of Lincoln, 143 F.3d 1152 (8th
Cir. 1998); Spiritual Psychic Science Church Of Truth, Inc. v. City Of Azusa, 703 P.2d
1119 (1985) (applying the California Constitution’s free speech provision), disapproved in
part on other grounds, Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 318 (2002); Trimble v. City of
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special doctrine be limited to personalized advice, or would more general
advice to the public also be more regulable? Third, what should the test be:
Should it give the government a free hand? Should it only allow restrictions
aimed at protecting clients from negligence or undue pressure?
Again, though, whatever the right result might be, the “conduct-speech”
distinction is likely to be more misleading than helpful. When the
government restricts professionals from speaking to their clients, it’s
restricting speech, not conduct. And it’s restricting the speech precisely
because of the message that it communicates, or the harms that may flow
from this message.258
The restriction is not a “legitimate regulation of professional practice
with only incidental impact on speech”;259 the impact on the speech is the
purpose of the restriction, not just an incidental matter. The restriction may
be valid, but for reasons having to do with the harm that negligent speech
can cause, the potential value to the patient or to third parties of mandated
speech, or the danger that the speech may make the patient psychologically
dependent on the speaker—not because the regulated speech is somehow
conduct.
VI.

CONCLUSION

It’s often tempting to dismiss First Amendment problems by labeling.
“It’s not speech,” the argument goes, “it’s conduct / contempt / libel /
sedition / aiding and abetting / professional speech.” Sometimes, the
New Iberia, 73 F. Supp. 2d 659 (W.D. La. 1999); Angeline v. Mahoning County Agr. Soc.,
993 F. Supp. 627 (N.D. Ohio 1998); Rushman v. City of Milwaukee, 959 F. Supp. 1040
(E.D. Wis. 1997).
I’ve found only one case that allowed government regulations of professional-client
speech and considered the relevance of the fortune-telling cases—National Ass’n for the
Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. California Bd. of Psychiatry, 228 F.3d 1043, 1056 n.9
(9th Cir. 2000), which cited Spiritual Psychic Science Church and distinguished it on the
grounds that “California’s licensing scheme does not prohibit psychoanalysis [as did the
anti-fortunetelling ordinance], but merely regulates who can engage in it for a fee.” This,
though, can’t be the right distinction by itself: If speech is protected from a content-based
ban, then it’s also normally protected from a content-based requirement that all people who
engage in such speech for money be licensed and trained. Cf. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.
Members of New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116-18 (1991). Rather, the
distinction must be that the government has more authority to regulate psychotherapistpatient speech than fortuneteller-client speech.
258
See supra note 246.
259
SEC v. Lowe, 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985) (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
See also Oregon Bar v. Smith, 942 P.2d 793, 801 (Or. Ct. App. 1997) (upholding
unauthorized practice of law statute on the grounds that it focuses only on “the conduct of a
profession—the practice of law”); State v. Niska, 380 N.W.2d 646, 648-49 (N.D. 1986)
(likewise).
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dismissal is sound: For instance, some behavior is indeed conduct that is
punished because of its noncommunicative elements, not because of what it
communicates.260 And often the label does capture something important
even as to speech, though only as a step in the First Amendment inquiry:
Some speech that constitutes aiding and abetting or common-law libel is
indeed unprotected, for reasons related to why criminal law or tort law
seeks to punish it.261
But sometimes the label is used as a substitute for serious First
Amendment analysis, rather than as the starting point for it; hence the
Court’s repeated complaint about the government’s trying to “foreclose the
exercise of constitutional rights by mere labels,”262 such as by labeling
speech “solicitation,” “contempt,” or “breach of the peace.” Sometimes
such attempts are made by people who want to justify restricting certain
kinds of speech. Sometimes they’re made by people who want to protect
other kinds of speech, and who therefore articulate supposedly absolutist
First Amendment rules—for instance, Justice Black’s “no law means no
law”263—and dismiss inconvenient counterexamples by calling them mere
“conduct.”264
I have argued above that we should resist this temptation. When the law
restricts speech because of what the speech communicates—because the
speech causes harms by persuading, informing, or offending—we shouldn’t
deny that the law is a speech restriction, and requires some serious
justification.
Such justifications may at times be available. The Court has so held as
to incitement, false statements of fact, obscenity, threats, and other
260

See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
See, e.g., Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, supra note 3, at pt. V.B.
262
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963) (referring to the label “solicitation”);
see also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (“In deciding the
question now, we are compelled by neither precedent nor policy to give any more weight to
the epithet ‘libel’ than we have to other ‘mere labels’ of state law. Like insurrection,
contempt, advocacy of unlawful acts, breach of the peace, obscenity, solicitation of legal
business, and the various other formulae for the repression of expression that have been
challenged in this Court, libel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional
limitations.”).
263
See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J.,
concurring); ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 512 (1994).
264
See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 457 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(reasoning that “speech is . . . immune from prosecution,” and distinguishing falsely
shouting fire in a crowded theatre on the grounds that such a shout is “speech brigaded with
action”); id. at 449-50 (Black, J., concurring) (endorsing Justice Douglas’s opinion); Cohen
v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 27 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Black, J.)
(reasoning that profanity on a person’s jacket is unprotected because it’s “mainly conduct
and little speech”); Van Alstyne, supra note 136, at 114 n.15 (rightly faulting Justice Black
for this approach).
261
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unprotected categories of speech. Courts should also develop similar rules
for certain kinds of crime-facilitating speech, professional speech,
treasonous speech, and so on. But courts and scholars ought to develop
these rules with the recognition that the rules are indeed speech
restrictions—not by asserting that the rules merely restrict “conduct.”

